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Abstract: In this paper I critically analyse the view that John Hicks sought to 
establish, according to which Walras’ and Marshall’s approaches to price theory, 
while differing in scope (that is, general vs. partial analysis), are basically similar in 
their aims, presuppositions and results. By focusing on a special kind of economy 
(the pure-exchange, two-commodity economy), which has been formally studied by 
both economists with the help of similar tools, we can precisely identify the 
differences between the two approaches. In particular, I am able to prove that there 
exists a definite trade-off between observability of the disequilibrium process and 
generality of the equilibrium concept: for Marshall can succeed in modelling a 
process of exchange in ‘real’ time with observable out-of-equilibrium trades only at 
the cost of confining his analysis to a partial equilibrium framework; whereas 
Walras can succeed in developing a truly general equilibrium model only at the cost 
of accepting that the underlying equilibration process be downgraded to a virtual 
process in ‘logical’ time. 
 
1 Introduction 
In Value and Capital (1st edn 1939, 2nd edn 1946) John Hicks pursues the twofold 
ambitious task of: 1) synthesising into a grand unified theory several diverse 
strands and traditions of economic thought, including ‘the economists of the 
Lausanne school, Walras and Pareto, to whom […] Wicksell should be added’, on 
one side, and Alfred Marshall and his followers, on the other; and 
2) accommodating into such a unified framework most of the ‘novelties’ in the field 
of economic dynamics put forward in the inter-war period by a few economists 
adopting ‘Marshallian methods’, above all John Maynard Keynes, and some 
economists, such as Gunnar Myrdal and Erik Lindahl, following in Knut Wicksell’s 
steps. The kind of unity that Hicks claims for his great book ‘lies not in unity of 
subject, but in unity of method’; and such unifying method, as Hicks himself does 
not cease to repeat, is ‘the method of General Equilibrium’ or ‘the Walrasian 
method’ (Hicks 1946, pp. 1-4, 60). 
Yet, if one specifically focuses on Part I, ‘The Theory of Subjective 
Value’, of Value and Capital, where consumer demand theory is discussed in 
detail, individual choice theory is outlined and static demand-and-supply analysis is 
introduced, one may be led to doubt the truth of Hicks’ statements about the 
unifying role of the ‘Walrasian’ or ‘General Equilibrium method’ in his work. For, 
after praising the mature Pareto, that is, the Pareto of the Manuel d’économie 
politique (1909), for his advocacy of the ordinalist approach to ‘value theory’, an 
approach that – according to Hicks – is definitely superior to the older cardinalist 
perspective pervading ‘Marshall’s theory’, as well as the theory ‘of Jevons, and 
Walras, and the Austrians’ (1946, pp. 3, 12, 17-18), Hicks goes on to say: 
I shall take for granted not Pareto’s value theory but the more 
familiar value theory of Marshall; and this will have some 
advantages, since I do not regard Pareto’s theory as being 
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superior to Marshall’s in all respects. One of the things we have 
to do is to fill out Pareto’s theory in those respects where it is 
defective compared to Marshall’s. (Hicks 1946, p. 3) 
This sentence might seem to support the idea that, after all, in Value and 
Capital the ‘arid’ and exceedingly complex ‘method of General Equilibrium’, 
advocated by the economists of the Lausanne school, stands on a par with 
Marshall’s much more realistic and simpler method of analysis, resting, as it does, 
on the latter’s ‘simplifications of genius’ (p. 32). Yet, with the benefit of hindsight, 
one can confidently conclude that, though occasionally endorsed by Hicks himself, 
the idea that the two alternative ‘methods’, the Walrasian and the Marshallian, 
ought to play a symmetrical role in Hicks’ endeavour at constructing a grand 
unified theory is entirely deceptive: for Value and Capital is an essentially 
Walrasian work, which, seventy years after its first appearance, can be legitimately 
regarded as both the starting point and the foundation of the neo-Walrasian research 
programme evolving over the post-war period. On the contrary, Marshall’s 
influence, though pervasive, is often quite superficial, boiling down to the use of 
vaguely Marshallian terms with which to rephrase characteristically Walrasian 
constructs, presumably in the hope of making them more palatable to the English-
speaking economics profession: the most extraordinary instance of this modus 
operandi is Hicks’ decision to employ an expression of Marshallian derivation, 
namely, ‘temporary equilibrium’, to label a distinctly Walrasian general 
equilibrium concept, a concept that will become one of the pillars of the neo-
Walrasian research programme. 
In spite of its ineffectiveness, however, Hicks’ declared purpose of 
blending Marshall’s approach to ‘value theory’ with the general equilibrium 
approach is enough, by itself, to produce major effects not only on the structure of 
Value and Capital, but also, in view of the paramount role played by that book in 
twentieth-century economics, on some subsequent developments of economic 
theory up to the present times: in particular, the received view of the relationship 
between Walras’ and Marshall’s conceptions of equilibrium and disequilibrium, the 
subject-matter of this paper, turns out to be powerfully affected by the stance 
originally taken by Hicks on this issue in his 1939 book. 
As a matter of fact, in order to pursue his alleged, though publicly stated, 
goal of bringing together the Walrasian and the Marshallian ‘methods’, while in 
fact preserving the supremacy of the Walrasian one, Hicks is naturally led, as a first 
step in his undertaking, to re-read or ‘translate’ or ‘transcribe’ or ‘restate’ 
Marshall’s ‘value theory’ in characteristically Walrasian–Paretian terms (pp. 17, 
20, 128). This is done, firstly, by interpreting the Marshallian individual demand 
(or excess-demand) function as a special case of the Walrasian–Paretian individual 
demand (or excess-demand) function, namely, as a function obtained as the result 
of the maximisation of a utility function that is quasi-linear in ‘money’, under 
otherwise standard Walrasian competitive conditions, that is, under the assumption 
of parametrically rational, price-taking agents (pp. 17-8, 20, 31-2, 38-40); and, 
secondly, by interpreting Marshall’s assumption about the ‘constancy of the 
marginal utility of money’ as if it were formally equivalent, in the Walrasian–
Paretian framework, to the assumption that ‘income effects can be neglected’ 
(p. 40; see also pp. 26-7, 32, 128). 
Now, while Hicks’ reinterpretation of Marshall’s theory of demand (or 
excess-demand) is definitely incorrect, his reading of the ‘constancy of the 
marginal utility of money’ assumption is inaccurate and misleading. Yet, Hicks’ 
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restatement of Marshall’s theory, particularly of Marshall’s theory of demand (or 
excess-demand), has proved to be remarkably influential: practically all the 
formalised reconstructions of Marshall’s price theory, of both the traditional type, 
drawing on geometrical methods (see, for example, Boulding 1945; Walker 1969), 
and the modern type, resting instead on analytical methods (see, for example, 
Varian 1987, pp. 60, 112-13; Varian 1992, pp. 105-8; Mas-Colell, Whinston and 
Green 1995, Chapter 10, pp. 311-49), endorse Hicks’ assimilation of Marshall’s 
demand (or excess-demand) theory to a special case of standard Walrasian 
competitive demand (or excess-demand) theory. Of course, a few dissenting voices, 
from Milton Friedman’s (1949) classical paper on the Marshallian demand curve to 
the more recent contributions by Michel De Vroey (1999a, 1999b, 1999c) on the 
Marshall–Walras divide, have tried to contrast the prevailing reductionist trend 
from different perspectives; yet, being chiefly unformalised and methodologically 
oriented, these papers have not succeeded in breaking the analytical scaffolding 
erected by Hicks and thereafter accepted by theorists and historians alike. 
It is only in a few old-style text-books (such as Baumol 1997, p. 179; 
Chiang 2005, p. 32), still concerned with the outmoded issue of equilibrium 
establishment, that one can find some vague hints of the analytical differences that 
underlie Walras’ and Marshall’s demand-and-supply analysis, differences that 
would seem to make the reductionist programme problematic. As pointed out by 
such diligent text-book writers, in fact, in the simple price-quantity diagram 
currently employed in elementary partial equilibrium analyses of an isolated 
market, the price and quantity variables apparently play different roles according to 
whether the model is viewed from a Walrasian or a Marshallian perspective: for, 
while in Walras’ case the price ought to be regarded as the ‘independent’ variable 
and the quantity as the ‘dependent’ one, the reverse would seem to hold in 
Marshall’s case. 
As a matter of fact, the issue of equilibrium establishment, and specifically 
of the differences existing in this respect between Marshall and Walras, had not 
escaped Hicks’ attention. This is witnessed by the ‘Note to Chapter IX’ of Value 
and Capital, revealingly entitled ‘The Formation of Prices’, where Hicks tries to 
assess whether the issue of equilibrium establishment, unconvincingly tackled (in 
Hicks’ opinion) by Walras in a general equilibrium framework by means of his 
virtual tâtonnement construct, might be more satisfactorily dealt with by resorting 
to the ‘ingenious argument’ put forward by Marshall ‘in the second chapter of his 
fifth book, [entitled ‘Temporary equilibrium of demand and supply’], and in his 
Appendix on Barter’. According to Hicks, Marshall’s argument, developed as usual 
in a partial equilibrium framework, is: 
designed to show that the process of fixing prices by trial and 
error, necessary when market conditions are changing, need not 
have any appreciable effect upon the prices ultimately fixed. 
(Hicks 1946, p. 127) 
Having reduced Marshall’s theory to a special case of Walras’ theory, the 
case where ‘income effects can be neglected’, Hicks can now reinterpret Marshall’s 
argument as implying ‘that a change in price in the midst of trading has the same 
sort of effect as a redistribution of wealth’ (p. 128) and can therefore be neglected 
in view of Marshall’s assumptions. This argument is once again inaccurate and 
misleading. And yet, in spite of this, it has proved capable of impinging on most of 
the subsequent debates on the nature and working of the equilibration processes in 
both partial and general equilibrium analysis. Even more seriously incorrect, 
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however, is Hicks’ suggestion that his own reinterpretation of Marshall’s argument 
can be extended to Walras’ general equilibrium framework, provided that ‘the 
transactions that take place at “very false” prices are limited in volume’ (p. 129), so 
that the ensuing income effects are not excessively disturbing. Unlike the first part 
of Hicks’ argument, the second has never become very popular, maybe because 
Hicks himself hastens to disavow it (p. 131). Yet it is a wrong conjecture still 
lingering in the literature. 
In this paper I want to oppose the received view, largely resting on the 
interpretation of Marshall’s ‘value theory’ originally put forward by Hicks in Value 
and Capital, implying the basic equivalence of the two traditional approaches to 
price theory. Specifically, I want to show that Marshall’s analysis of the 
equilibration process and his related interpretation of the equilibrium concept are 
essentially different from, and irreducible to, Walras’ analysis and interpretation. 
Further, I want to show that the patent difference in scope of the two authors’ 
respective theories (that is, partial vs. general analysis), far from being an accidental 
outcome of history or the innocuous consequence of the idiosyncratic preferences 
of the two economists, is in effect the unavoidable and irremediable by-product of 
their different analytical assumptions and explanatory aims. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, I describe 
the model economy providing the common ground for our analysis, namely, the 
pure-exchange, two-commodity economy with a finite number of traders, greater 
than or equal to two, which underlies both Marshall’s and Walras’ initial theorising 
about price theory. Section 3 is devoted to Walras’ analysis. In this case, due to the 
relatively formalised expository style adopted by Walras himself, it proves 
convenient to keep the formal statement of the theory disconnected from the informal 
discussion of both its interpretation and the textual evidence supporting it: hence, in 
subsection 3.1, I start by stating the three basic assumptions about the trading 
process on which Walras’ analysis (in its final form) is based; in subsection 3.2 
I formally state Walras’ equilibrium model of a pure-exchange, two-commodity 
economy with an arbitrary finite number of traders (if this number were equal to 
two, the economy would boil down to an Edgeworth Box economy, but this 
restriction is unnecessary in Walras’ case); subsection 3.3 deals with interpretative 
and hermeneutical issues; finally, the possibility of further extending Walras’ 
model to multi-commodity exchange and production economies is discussed in 
subsection 3.4. Section 4 is devoted to Marshall’s analysis. Due to Marshall’s 
peculiar style of exposition, which is eminently literary and unformalised, it seems 
preferable, in this case, to take a different route from that followed in examining 
Walras’ approach: precisely, starting from a hermeneutical discussion of Marshall’s 
informal account of his own approach, I shall strive to jointly reconstruct both the 
implicit formal apparatus and the associated interpretation of Marshall’s theory. 
Specifically, in subsection 4.1, I discuss Marshall’s basic assumptions about the 
trading process; in subsection 4.2, I formalise Marshall’s model of an Edgeworth 
Box economy, one version of which deals with an economy where one of the two 
commodities is a money-commodity; then, in subsection 4.3, I discuss Marshall’s 
so-called ‘temporary equilibrium’ model, which can be viewed as a generalisation 
of the model of an Edgeworth Box economy with a money-commodity, allowing 
for a finite number of traders greater than two; finally, the possibility of further 
extending Marshall’s ‘temporary equilibrium’ model to multi-commodity exchange 
and production economies is discussed in subsection 4.4. Section 5 compares the 
two approaches and concludes the paper. 
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2 A Common Ground for the Analysis: the Pure-Exchange, 
Two-Commodity Economy 
Let us consider Walras’ and Marshall’s main theoretical works, namely, Walras’ 
Eléments d’économie politique pure1 and Marshall’s Principles of Economics2. 
While most chapters of the Eléments are explicitly devoted to competitive price 
theory (no less than thirty-one Lessons out of the forty-two composing the fourth 
and fifth editions of the Eléments deal with that topic), the same is not true of the 
Principles: since its second edition, in fact, Marshall’s treatise consists of six 
Books, of which only one (Book V, on ‘The General Relations of Demand, Supply 
and Value’) is entirely devoted to price theory. But, apart from the different 
quantitative emphasis the two books place on price theory, they differ so widely in 
their qualitative treatment of that subject that a quick reader might easily be led to 
despair of the reasonableness or fruitfulness of any formal comparison between the 
two approaches. Yet, on closer inspection, a well-defined set of theoretical issues 
can be identified that represent the common starting point for both Walras’ and 
Marshall’s inquiries into the field of price theory. Such a common starting point 
consists of the problem of the determination of equilibrium prices and quantities in 
a pure-exchange, two-commodity economy: Walras deals with that problem in Part 
II, Lessons 5 to 10, of the fourth and fifth editions of the Eléments (Walras 1954, 
pp. 83-152);3 Marshall deals with it in Chapter II of Book V and in Appendix F of 
the Principles (Marshall 1961a, pp. 331-6 and 791-3).4 Even though, from a 
quantitative point of view, the theory of the determination of equilibrium prices and 
quantities in a pure-exchange, two-commodity economy represents only a small 
part of Walras’ overall competitive equilibrium theory, as put forward in the 
Eléments, and an even smaller part of Marshall’s overall theory of market 
equilibrium, as developed in Book V of the last four editions of the Principles, such 
a theory plays a fundamental role in either author’s theoretical construction, for in 
either case it is the cornerstone on which the whole building is erected.5 Anyhow, 
since the problem of equilibrium price determination in a pure-exchange, two-
commodity economy is the only problem which is formally discussed by both authors 
in their respective treatises with the help of similar analytical tools, any comparison 
between the two authors, as far as price theory is concerned, cannot but start from the 
analysis of their respective models of the simplified economy under discussion. 
Let us then consider a pure-exchange economy with 2=L  commodities, 
denoted by 2,1=l , and I consumers-traders (henceforth indifferently referred to 
as either consumers or traders), denoted by Ii ,...,1= , with 2≥I . Each 
consumer i is characterised by a consumption set ( ){ }=≡= iiii xxxX 21 , ℝ 2+ , a 
preference relation ≿ i on iX , and endowments ( )∈≡ iii 21 ,ωωω ℝ 2+ \{ }0 . Let 
( ) ⊂×=∈=
= i
I
iI XXxxx 11,..., ℝ I2+  be an allocation; ∑
=
∈≡
I
i i1
ωω ℝ 2++  be the 
aggregate endowments; { }∑
=
×
=∈=
I
i i
I
pe xXxA 1
2 : ω  be the set of feasible, non-
wasteful allocations. Specifically, in accordance with Walras’ and Marshall’s 
original assumptions, let us assume consumer i’s preferences to be represented by a 
cardinal utility function →ii Xu : ℝ, which, for all i, is supposed to be both 
additively separable,6 that is, 
iiiiiiii Xxxvxvxu ∈∀+= ),()()( 2211 , 
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and twice continuously differentiable, with 
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2
, 
where >>0 in the first inequality means that the first-order partial derivatives of 
consumer i’s utility function, that is, i’s marginal utility functions, are strictly 
positive, while  <0 in the second inequality means that the pure second-order partial 
derivatives are non-positive.7 
Such an economy will be denoted by ℰ ( ){ }IiiiiIpe uX 12 ),(, =× ⋅= ω  in the 
following. When 2=I , the pure-exchange, two-commodity, two-consumer 
economy ℰ {22 =×pe (ℝ })),(, 2 12 =+ ⋅ iiiu ω  will be called an Edgeworth Box economy and 
denoted by ℰ EB  in the following. 
Given a pure-exchange, two-commodity, I -consumer economy ℰ Ipe×2 , for 
all i and all ii Xx ∈ , let 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )ii
ii
i
ii
i
ii
ixiuidxixiui
i
i
i
xv
xv
x
xu
x
xu
dx
dx
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22
11
2
1
1
2
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′
′
=
∂
∂
∂
∂
=≡
=+
 
be consumer i’s marginal rate of substitution of commodity 2 for commodity 1 
when i’s consumption is ix : namely, ( )ii xMRS21  is the quantity of commodity 2 
that consumer i would be willing to exchange for one unit of commodity 1 at the 
margin, in order to keep his or her utility unchanged at the original level )( ii xu . Let 
∈−−≡−≡≡ ),())(,()( 221121 iiiiiiiiiii xxxxzzxz ωωω ℝ 2  be consumer i’s net 
demand, when his consumption is ix . Consumer i’s net demand for commodity l , 
)( ili xz , can be either positive, in which case )( ili xz  is called consumer i’s net 
demand proper for commodity l  and consumer i is said to be a net buyer of that 
commodity, or negative, in which case )( ili xz  is called consumer i’s net supply of 
commodity l  and consumer i is said to be a net seller of that commodity. 
Now, let us suppose that consumer i can trade commodity 2 for 
commodity 1 either on the market, or through bilateral bargains, or according to 
any other suitably specified voluntary exchange technology. When consumer i’s 
consumption is ix , if the marginal rate at which i can trade commodity 2 for 
commodity 1, that is 
i
i
i
i
dx
dx
dx
dx
1
2
1
2
=− , is exactly equal to ( )ii xMRS21 , then i’s 
utility is unaffected by a marginal trade of commodity 2 for commodity 1, 
irrespective of whether i is a net buyer or seller of commodity 1; for in that case: 
 Marshall vs Walras    7 
_____________________________________________________________________________  
0)()()()()()( 2221112
2
1
1
=′+′=
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=∇= iiiiiii
i
ii
i
i
ii
iiiii dxxvdxxvdx
x
xudx
x
xudxxuxdu
 
On the contrary, consumer i’s utility increases if the marginal rate of 
exchange of commodity 2 for commodity 1 is less (respectively, greater) than 
( )ii xMRS21 , provided that i is a net buyer (respectively, seller) of commodity 1. 
Hence ( )ii xMRS21  can also be interpreted as the maximum (respectively, 
minimum) quantity of commodity 2 that a utility-maximising buyer i (respectively, 
seller i) of commodity 1 is willing to pay (respectively, to receive) at the margin in 
exchange for one unit of commodity 1, when i’s consumption is ix . By using an 
expression which is currently employed in the literature in a related context, we can 
summarise the above interpretation of the marginal rate of substitution by saying 
that ( )ii xMRS21  represents consumer i’s ‘reservation price’ of commodity 1 in 
terms of commodity 2, when i’s consumption is ix . (Though the expression 
‘reservation price’ can be indifferently employed irrespective of whether consumer 
i is a buyer or a seller, its specific meaning depends of course on the nature of the 
trade that i is willing to carry out.) 
3 Walras’ Approach 
As anticipated in the introductory section, in Walras’ case it is convenient to put 
forward the formal model of a pure-exchange, two-commodity economy first, 
postponing all interpretative issues to a later subsection. 
3.1 Three Basic Assumptions about the Trading Process 
To begin with, let us state three assumptions which, as we shall see, underlie not 
only the simple model with which I am exclusively concerned here, but indeed all 
of Walras’ equilibrium models, provided that they are taken in their final form (that 
is, in the form given to them in the fourth edition of the Eléments (1900)). In order 
to make the understanding of Walras’ approach to price theory easier, the basic 
assumptions about the trading process are separately stated below, even if they are 
obviously interrelated and often confused, occasionally by Walras himself, or 
jointly formulated in the literature. 
Assumption 1 (‘Law of One Price’) 
At each instant of the trading process, a price is quoted in the market for each 
commodity. Moreover, if any transaction concerning a given commodity takes 
place at any instant of the trading process, then it takes place at the price quoted at 
that instant. 
Assumption 2 (‘Perfect Competition’) 
All traders behave competitively, that is, they take prices as given parameters in 
making their optimising choices. 
Assumption 3 (‘No Trade out of Equilibrium’) 
No transaction concerning any commodity is allowed to take place out of 
equilibrium. 
The wording of the above assumptions has been carefully chosen in order 
to make their statement consistent with Walras’ original discussion, ambiguities not 
excepted. The exact meaning of the assumptions cannot be explained without first 
8 History of Economics Review 
_____________________________________________________________________________  
defining the undefined terms appearing therein. The required definitions will be 
given in the next subsection, with specific reference to the model of a pure-
exchange, two-commodity economy, while a general discussion of the assumptions 
is deferred to subsections 3.3 and 3.4 below. 
3.2 Walras’ Model of a Pure-Exchange, Two-Commodity Economy 
Let us consider a pure-exchange, two-commodity economy 
ℰ ( ){ }IiiiiIpe uX 12 ),(, =× ⋅= ω , where the consumers’ characteristics satisfy all the 
assumptions made in section 2, with the further restriction that, for all i, the second-
order pure partial derivatives of the utility functions be strictly negative, that is 
( ) iiiiii
i
ii
i
ii Xxxvxv
x
xu
x
xu
∈∀<<′′′′=








∂
∂
∂
∂
,0)(),()(,)( 22112
2
2
2
1
2
. 
The assumptions on the signs of the partial derivatives of the consumers’ 
utility functions that I have adopted here are in effect more demanding than 
Walras’ original ones: for Walras typically assumes the marginal utility of 
commodity l to go to zero for ix < ∞  (Walras 1954, p. 117). On the contrary, 
with a view to simplifying our discussion, I assume here the marginal utilities of 
both commodities to be strictly positive and monotonically decreasing over each 
consumer’s entire consumption set: this assumption, allowing us to dodge all 
boundary problems and obtain well-defined demand and excess-demand 
functions, can anyhow be dispensed with, at the cost of complicating somewhat 
the analysis. 
Let ∈= ),( 21 ppp ℝ 2++  be the price system, where prices are expressed in 
terms of units of account. The assumed positivity of prices is justified by the 
assumption of strong monotonicity of consumers’ preferences. In view of 
Assumption 1, one ought to specify the instant of the trading process at which a 
given price system is quoted. Yet, since traders’ choices necessarily refer to the 
same instant as the quoted prices, while the data (consumption sets, preferences, 
endowments) are assumed to be invariant over the exchange process (ibid., pp. 
117, 146), all the variables appearing in the following equations, which formalise 
the equilibrium determination problem (‘economic statics’, in Walras’ words), 
would invariably refer to one and the same instant, namely, that instant at which 
prices are supposed to be quoted. This, however, makes the dating of the 
variables superfluous. Hence, following Walras’ own lead in this respect, 
qualification of the price system, through time subscripts referring to the 
evolution of the trading process, is avoided here: I know that such process 
evolves over time, but do not need, at this stage, to make such evolution explicit.8 
Finally, under Assumptions 1 and 2, consumers’ optimising choices turn out to be 
homogeneous of degree zero in prices, as we shall see in a moment. But this 
implies that the price system can be normalised without any effect on consumers’ 
choices. With just two commodities, we only need one relative price, namely, 
1
21
2
1
12
−
≡≡ p
p
pp . Focusing on this relative price is tantamount to normalising the 
price system by taking commodity 2 as the numeraire, which in turn means setting 
12 ≡p . 
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Under the stated assumptions, solving the constrained utility 
maximisation problem for competitive consumer i results into the following two-
equation system: 
12
22
11
2
21
1
21
)(
)(
),(
),(
p
xv
xv
x
xxu
x
xxu
ii
ii
i
iii
i
iii
=
′
′
=
∂
∂
∂
∂
   (1) 
iiii pxxp 21122112 ωω +=+ ,    (2) 
 
from which one gets consumer i’s Walrasian direct demand and excess demand 
functions, ),( 12 ii px ω  and iiiii pxpz ωωω −≡ ),(),( 1212 , respectively, for 
Ii ,...,1= . 
Now, under Assumptions 1 and 2, aggregating individual demand and 
excess demand functions is immediate: for, since all consumers receive the same 
price signals (by Assumption 1), which they take as given parameters (by 
Assumption 2), the individual demand and excess demand functions always depend 
on the same variables and can consequently be summed over all consumers. Hence, 
letting ∑∑
==
−≡≡
I
i iii
I
i ii
pxpzpz
1 121 1212
),(),(),( ωωωω  be the Walrasian 
aggregate excess demand function, where ),...,( 1 Iωωω = , the following market-
clearing conditions are obtained: 
0),( 121 =ωWpz      (3') 
and 
0),( 122 =ωWpz      (3'') 
where Wp12  denotes a Walrasian equilibrium price of commodity 1 in terms of 
commodity 2. 
From the budget constraint equations (2), by rearranging terms and 
summing across consumers, we get the so-called Walras’ Law, that is: 
[ ] 0,0),(),(),(),( 12122121121 12212112 ≥∀=+=+∑ = ppzpzppzpzp
I
i iiii
ωωωω . 
Since, due to Walras’ Law, equation (3'') is necessarily satisfied when 
equation (3') holds (ibid., p. 139), we can focus attention on the latter equation 
only. Under the stated assumptions, equation (3') has at least one solution, which 
however need not be unique. Each solution yields a Walrasian equilibrium price of 
commodity 1 in terms of commodity 2, Wp12 , to which a corresponding Walrasian 
equilibrium allocation, ( ))(),...,(),...,()( 121212112 WIWiWW pxpxpxpx = , is associated. 
3.3 Walras’ Model: Textual Evidence and Interpretation 
Economists are so accustomed to regarding the model put forward in the previous 
subsection as typically Walrasian that many, or even most, of them may deem it 
otiose to inquire whether or not the model, as well as the assumptions on which it 
rests, can indeed be traced back to Walras’ Eléments. Yet this question is by no 
means trivial: answering it will prove much more complicated than it might appear 
at first sight. 
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Right at the beginning of Lesson 5 of the Eléments, where Walras starts his 
discussion of the ‘problem of the exchange of two commodities for each other’, one 
finds a long illustrative passage, where the functioning of a real-word competitive 
market, the market for the so-called ‘3 per cent French Rentes’, is described in 
great detail. This example is obviously meant to provide a gradual introduction to 
the more formal examination of the problem at issue, to be developed in the 
following pages. Precisely owing to its informal character, however, Walras’ 
introductory discussion of the functioning of a real-world market discloses a 
number of conceptual difficulties, which are instead concealed under the more 
cautious language of formal analysis. Hence it may be useful to start from the 
securities example:9 
Let us take, for example, trading in 3 per cent French Rentes on 
the Paris Stock Exchange and confine our attention to these 
operations alone. 
The three per cent, as they are called, are quoted at 60 
francs. […] 
We have now to make three suppositions according as the 
demand is equal to, greater than, or less than the offer. 
First supposition. The quantity demanded at 60 francs is 
equal to the quantity offered at this same price. […] The rate of 
60 francs is maintained. The market is in a stationary state or 
equilibrium. 
Second supposition. The brokers with orders to buy can no 
longer find brokers with orders to sell. […] Brokers […] make 
bids at 60 francs 05 centimes. They raise the market price. 
Third supposition. Brokers with orders to sell can no longer 
find brokers with orders to buy. […] Brokers […] make offers 
at 59 francs 95 centimes. They lower the price.  
This passage reveals that the starting point of Walras’ analysis is indeed 
represented by a very realistic picture of the trading process, a picture which 
apparently stands at a very great distance from the highly stylised image of the 
same process emerging from the basic assumptions and the formal model presented 
above. 
The first striking difference lies in the following: while the model deals 
with an economy where two commodities proper are traded for one another, the 
example concerns instead a market where a commodity proper is exchanged for 
money. Since, as we shall see, Marshall’s ‘temporary equilibrium’ model deals 
precisely with a market where a commodity proper (‘corn’) is exchanged for 
money,10 it is particularly important, for our present purposes, to clarify Walras’ 
position in this respect. 
Now, concerning this point, Walras is fortunately very clear. For, a few 
lines after the securities example quoted above, he adds: 
Securities, however, are a very special kind of commodity. 
Furthermore, the use of money in trading has peculiarities of its 
own, the study of which must be postponed until later, and not 
interwoven at the outset with the general phenomenon of value 
in exchange. Let us, therefore, retrace our steps and state our 
observations in scientific terms. We may take any two 
commodities, say oats and wheat, or, more abstractly, (A) and 
(B). (Walras, 1954, pp. 86-7) 
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In sharply disconnecting the introductory example from the ‘scientific’ 
discussion of the problem of the exchange of two commodities for one another, 
Walras takes due care of restoring the symmetry between the two commodities 
composing the economy under discussion, a symmetry that had been broken, in his 
example, by the existence, side by side, of such heterogeneous objects as money, 
with its ‘peculiarities’, and a commodity proper. Precisely, in his ‘scientific’ 
treatment of the problem at hand, no money exists in any other sense than 
possibly that of being a unit of account; at the same time, either commodity can 
indifferently be taken as the numeraire of the economy. As we shall see, this 
restored symmetry, which sharply distinguishes Walras’ formal treatment of the 
pure-exchange, two-commodity economy from Marshall’s, plays a fundamental 
role in allowing Walras to generalise his approach to more complex economies 
and models. 
Coming now to what I have called the three basic assumptions concerning 
the trading process, one must admit that, at first sight, all three are disconfirmed by 
the securities example. As to Assumption 2 (‘Perfect Competition’), one can see 
that, in that example, there are traders that ‘make’ the price, in the sense that they 
make price bids, changing them according to the circumstances of the market 
(‘They raise the market price’, ‘They lower the prices’), so that traders cannot 
apparently be viewed as price-takers and the competitive assumption fails. But, 
since prices are individually changed by traders experiencing rationing, one cannot 
apparently be sure that different prices will not be quoted by different traders at the 
same time, so that also Assumption 1, the so-called ‘Law of One Price’, would not 
seem to apply in this case; nor can one exclude the possibility that some 
transactions will actually be carried out at out-of-equilibrium prices, so that 
Assumption 3, the ‘No Trade out of Equilibrium’ assumption, would fail as well. 
Now, also with respect to the basic assumptions concerning the trading 
process, one should be careful in distinguishing a mere illustrative example, which 
may reasonably be expected to be realistic and captivating, hence also somewhat 
imprecise, from a formal theoretical model, of which, on the contrary, one should 
demand absolute rigour and precision. But, in the case at hand, even in the more 
formal parts of his discussion, Walras’ defence of the fundamental assumptions 
underlying his pure-exchange model is not always so convincing as one might hope 
for. Even if the major difficulties concern Assumption 3, I prefer to proceed in 
order, starting from Assumption 1. 
The ‘Law of One Price’ is also referred to in the literature as ‘Jevons’ Law 
of Indifference’, since an apparently similar assumption was first introduced into 
the theoretical debate, under the name of ‘Law of Indifference’, by Jevons in his 
path-breaking book, The Theory of Political Economy (1st edn 1871; 2nd edn 
1879).11 According to Jevons, the ‘Law of Indifference’, ‘a general law of the 
utmost importance in economics’, can be stated as follows: 
[I]n the same open market, at any one moment, there cannot be 
two prices for the same kind of article. (Jevons 1879, p. 137) 
It should be noted that, in Jevons’ Theory, the epistemological status of the 
‘Law’ is unclear;12 and, as we shall see, this ambiguity will also persist in Walras’ 
and Marshall’s use of constructs and assumptions somehow related to Jevons’ 
‘Law’. In the first place, the time dimension of the ‘Law’ is uncertain: for, from the 
very wording of the definition, it would appear that the ‘Law’ is ‘instantaneous’ in 
nature, since it holds true ‘at any one moment’, but not over time (ibidem); yet, 
Jevons (1879, p. 138) does not hesitate to apply it to a ‘process of exchange’. In the 
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second place, Jevons appears to oscillate between interpreting the ‘Law’ as a ‘self-
evident principle’, which holds identically true under all circumstances, and 
viewing it as an equilibrium condition, which only holds true under special 
circumstances (ibid., pp. 137, 141-3). 
Jevons’ epistemological ambiguities are not entirely dispelled by Walras 
either. In fact, there are passages where Walras appears to interpret the ‘Law of 
One Price’ as an equilibrium condition, for example when he states that: 
there can be only one price in the market, namely the price at 
which total effective demand equals total effective offer [...]. 
(Walras 1954, p. 143) 
or when he summarises his analysis of the two-commodity, pure-exchange 
economy by means of the following proposition, which, according to him, 
‘embraces the whole of the pure and applied economics’: 
The exchange of two commodities for each other in a perfectly 
competitive market is an operation by which all holders of 
either one, or of both, of the two commodities can obtain the 
greatest possible satisfaction of their wants consistent with the 
condition that the two commodities are bought and sold at one 
and the same rate of exchange throughout the market. (Walras 
1954, p. 143; Walras’ italics) 
Yet, the interpretation of the ‘Law of One Price’ as a pure equilibrium 
condition, though supported by renowned interpreters of Walras’ thought (such as 
Morishima 1977, pp. 11-26), is ultimately unacceptable. For, as we have seen in the 
previous subsection, one of the distinguishing features of Walras’ model is its 
reliance on the concept of an aggregate demand and excess demand function. Now, 
if it is true that, by providing the market-clearing condition, the nullity of the 
aggregate excess demand function (equation (3') above) plays a fundamental role in 
defining the Walrasian equilibrium concept, it is also true that the very notion of an 
aggregate excess demand function could not even be defined if a uniform price, 
allegedly known to all traders, could not be supposed to exist in any case.13 Thus, it 
can be seen that the very structure of Walras’ model implies the universal validity 
of the ‘Law of One Price’, which must be supposed to hold under all circumstances, 
that is, both at equilibrium and out of equilibrium. 
A similar reasoning applies to Assumption 2: for the way in which Walras 
constructs the individual demand and excess demand functions, or ‘trader’s 
schedules’, as Walras calls them, leaves no doubt as to the fact that, for the 
purposes of the theory, he imagines the traders to take commodity prices (a single 
relative price, in the case at hand) as given parameters and to determine the 
quantities to be traded of the various commodities (two, in the case under 
discussion) in such a way as to maximise their utility functions.14 Hence we can 
conclude that the ‘Perfect Competition’ assumption, apparently disconfirmed by the 
securities example, is never really questioned by Walras in his formal model. 
In discussing the status of Assumptions 1 and 2 in Walras’ model of a 
pure-exchange, two-commodity economy, we have ascertained that such 
Assumptions hold in every case, that is, both at equilibrium and out of equilibrium. 
Up to now, however, I have not yet specified the exact nature of the disequilibrium 
states that can be regarded as consistent with Walras’ overall approach. This is not 
accidental, for the answer to this question crucially depends on the meaning and 
implications of Assumption 3, to which I now turn my attention. 
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Assumption 3 is the most problematic of all three: such controversial 
character is partly due to the fact that, in all probability, Walras did not initially 
realise the need for such an assumption. As a matter of fact, Walras’ original 
discussion of this issue – in both his early theoretical writings, such as the 1874 and 
1876 mémoires on the theory of exchange, and the first edition of the Eléments 
(1874–1877) – is highly ambiguous. To be precise, not only the securities example, 
but also the entire formulation of the pure-exchange model in the 1874 and 1876 
mémoires and in the first edition of the Eléments, are not inconsistent, to say the least, 
with the idea that some transactions may actually be carried out at disequilibrium 
prices. Moreover, should we extend our consideration to the production and capital 
formation models, we would immediately discover that, in the first three editions of 
the Eléments (hence up to 1896), such models explicitly contemplate out-of-
equilibrium transactions and other observable disequilibrium activities.15 
But to allow out-of-equilibrium trades to actually occur in the economy is 
inconsistent with the requirements of equilibrium determination in Walras’ 
approach. To see why, let us focus attention, once again for the sake of simplicity, 
on the pure-exchange model exclusively. In this model the occurrence of 
disequilibrium transactions would make the equilibrium indeterminate not only by 
altering the data of the economy (namely, the individual endowments), but also, 
and foremost, by changing such data in an unpredictable way: for Walras’ theory is 
indeed able to predict the plans of action optimally chosen by the traders at both 
equilibrium and disequilibrium prices, but it can only predict the traders’ actions 
(that is, their observable behaviour) when the economy is at equilibrium. 
These critical remarks, confusedly made by Joseph Bertrand in his 1883 
review-article of the second edition of Walras’ Théorie mathématique de la richesse 
sociale (1883), where Walras’ 1874 mémoire on the theory of exchange had been 
reprinted without any significant change, induced Walras to explicitly introduce a 
‘No Trade out of Equilibrium’ assumption into his theoretical system, first by 
dropping a short statement to this effect in an obscure article on Hermann Gossen 
published in 1885, and then, with specific reference to the pure-exchange model, by 
inserting a few well-chosen words into the securities example in the second (1889) 
and following editions of the Eléments: precisely, in discussing the three alternative 
‘suppositions’ which are separately analysed in that example, ‘according as the 
demand is equal to, greater than, or less than the offer’, Walras added the statement 
‘Exchange takes place’ in the case of market equilibrium, while he inserted the 
short sentences ‘Theoretically, trading should come to a halt’ and ‘Trading stops’ in 
the cases of excess demand and excess supply, respectively (Walras 1954, p. 85). 
As to the production and capital formation models discussed in the various editions 
of the Eléments, however, a sort of ‘No Trade out of Equilibrium’ assumption was 
only introduced in the fourth edition of the Eléments, published in 1900, when 
Walras eventually resolved to adopt the so-called ‘hypothèse des bons’: according 
to this assumption, all traders (that is, not only consumers, as in the pure-exchange 
model of the second and subsequent editions of the Eléments, but also producers 
and owners of the factors of production) are not allowed to carry out any actual 
transactions until an equilibrium is arrived at; until then, they can only exchange 
‘bons’, that is, conditional claims, which are not effective whenever the economy is 
out of equilibrium (Walras 1954, pp. 242, 282, 319; see Donzelli 2007). 
So, Assumption 3 is eventually vindicated, becoming one of the 
cornerstones of the Walrasian edifice in its final form. But it would be misleading 
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to conceal that it took more than a quarter of a century to Walras to convince 
himself that his theory could not do without such an assumption. 
3.4 Walras’ Model: Limitations and Extensions 
The reason why Walras so strenuously resisted the generalised adoption of the ‘No 
Trade out of Equilibrium’ assumption is easy to explain. This assumption, when 
combined with the other two, turns the process of adjustment towards equilibrium 
into a purely virtual process, where nothing observable can occur. Such virtual 
process evolves over a ‘logical’ time entirely disconnected from the ‘real’ time over 
which the economy is supposed to evolve. Hence, since it takes just one instant of 
‘real’ time for the adjustment process to carry its effects through, the equilibrium 
state, granting that it is eventually reached, must be imagined as ‘instantaneously’ 
arrived at, as far as the ‘real’ time of the economy is concerned. But this 
‘instantaneous’ character of the equilibrium concept, which Walras is eventually, 
though unwillingly, led to recognise,16 clashes with his original idea that the 
empirical content of general equilibrium theory crucially depends on the possibility 
of showing that an equilibrium state ‘comes to be established’ through an 
adjustment process in ‘real’ time, where observable behaviour is allowed both to 
take place and to play an essential role out of equilibrium. 
So, it is true that Walras’ basic assumptions about the nature of the trading 
process severely restrict the claims that his equilibrium approach, and especially the 
underlying theory of the equilibration process, can lay to descriptive realism. And it 
is also true that such restrictions are difficult to swallow, first of all for Walras 
himself, as the length of the period needed to accept them witnesses. But in the end 
he is willing to take this step, because he is aware that accepting those constraints is 
the price to be paid for achieving not only a theoretical consistency, but also a 
descriptive generality that would be unattainable otherwise. 
In fact, this can be easily seen by going back to the pure-exchange, two-
commodity model from which I started, and analysing the role played by Walras’ 
various assumptions in allowing him to extend the scope of this simple model, in 
such a way as to progressively encompass, in a very natural way, an ever larger set 
of economic issues and phenomena. In the first place, it should be stressed that, by 
assuming from the very beginning the ‘Law of One Price’ and ‘Perfect 
Competition’, Walras can directly attack the problem of equilibrium determination 
in an economy with any finite number of traders, without being forced either to 
confine his analysis to a two-trader economy, as Jevons (1871) had been forced to 
do, or to make further special assumptions on the traders’ characteristics, as 
Marshall will be compelled to do in his Principles (1890), as we shall see in the 
next section. Moreover, with regard to the traders’ characteristics, it should also be 
added that Walras’ original assumptions concerning the cardinality and additive 
separability of the traders’ utility functions turn out to be unnecessarily restrictive, 
even if Walras will never become aware of this, and can be easily disposed of, as 
Pareto (1906) proved a few years later, without jeopardising in the least Walras’ 
approach and results in dealing with the pure-exchange problem with any number 
of traders. Furthermore, by temporarily giving up the apparently realistic pretence 
to cope with both the exchange and the money issue at one and the same time 
within the pure-exchange, two-commodity model, and by choosing from the 
beginning to normalise the price system by taking one commodity proper, instead 
of money, as the numeraire of the economy, Walras makes it easier to smoothly 
generalise his analysis of the two-commodity economy to a multi-commodity 
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world, in a truly general equilibrium framework.17 Finally, by complementing the 
‘Law of One Price’ and the ‘Perfect Competition’ assumption with the ‘No Trade 
out of Equilibrium’ assumption, Walras makes it possible to apply the same 
analytical apparatus and the same ‘instantaneous’ equilibrium concept, already 
employed with reference to pure-exchange economies with an arbitrary number of 
traders, to more general economies with production, capital formation, and even 
money, which can eventually be reintroduced into the analysis. As can be seen, 
therefore, a sort of trade-off between realism, on the one hand, and consistency and 
generality, on the other, seems to apply in Walras’ case: giving up a relatively more 
realistic analysis of the disequilibrium process appears to be the price to be paid for 
gaining a sounder consistency and a greater generality in the field of equilibrium 
theory. 
This is the price that Hicks, in the Note to Chapter IX of Value and 
Capital, proves so reluctant to pay: for he is apparently convinced that the 
consistency and the generality of Walras’ General Equilibrium system can be 
bought at no cost, and especially without sacrificing the realistic flavour of 
Marshall’s analysis of the equilibration process, by simply applying to Walras’ 
theoretical system the ‘ingenious argument’ put forward by Marshall with reference 
to his barter and ‘temporary equilibrium’ models. To check this conjecture of 
Hicks, however, we have to carefully consider Marshall’s approach to price theory, 
to which I now turn. 
4 Marshall’s Approach 
As indicated in section 2, I am essentially concerned here with Marshall’s model of 
an Edgeworth Box economy, as expounded in ‘Appendix F. Barter’ in the fifth and 
following editions of the Principles, as well as with his ‘market-day’ or ‘temporary 
equilibrium’ model, as developed in Chapter II of Book V of the same treatise. The 
relationship between Marshall’s ‘temporary equilibrium’ model and his more 
elaborate ‘normal equilibrium’ models will be briefly discussed in subsection 4.4 
below. In Marshall’s case, for the reasons already stated, I shall try to reconstruct 
his formal models from a hermeneutical analysis of the available textual evidence, 
jointly developing theory and interpretation. 
4.1 Marshall’s Basic Assumptions about the Trading Process 
Unlike Walras, Marshall does not assume the traders to behave ‘competitively’, if 
by this expression one means that the traders take prices as given and choose 
quantities (that is, choose consumption or trade plans) in such a way as to maximise 
utility. This means that in Marshall one does not find demand or excess demand 
functions comparable to those of Walras, since the latter’s functions, as we have 
seen, essentially depend on the assumption of ‘Perfect Competition’ and the ‘Law 
of One Price’ (in the sense specified above). What we do find in Marshall are 
different kinds of functions, which are still related to the idea that the traders 
behave ‘rationally’ and ‘competitively’, even if Marshall’s conception of rationality 
and competition is different from that of Walras.18  
Marshall’s fundamental ideas about the trading process are the following: 
1) in a pure-exchange, two-commodity economy the trading process should be 
viewed as a sequence of bilateral bargains, each involving two traders at a time; and 
2) the conditions governing each individual bargain (quantities traded of the two 
commodities, hence rate of exchange between them) should be specified by 
exploiting the general properties of the marginal rate of substitution of one 
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commodity for the other for the two traders involved in the bargain, where the 
marginal rate of substitution is viewed as the reservation price of either a buyer or a 
seller, as the case may be. 
To develop Marshall’s model, let us focus on consumer i. At the beginning 
of the trading process, let 
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be the initial value of consumer i’s marginal rate of substitution of commodity 2 for 
commodity 1. Supposing that there exists a consumer ij ≠ , such that 
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assumes that any weakly advantageous bargain will be exploited by the party (or 
parties) benefiting from it, one can predict that consumer i’s initial allocation will 
change whenever there exists another consumer who, at his initial allocation, is 
characterised by a marginal rate of substitution different from i’s. But this 
prediction is obviously insufficient to make the analysis of the trading process 
involving consumer i determined: to this end, in fact, it would be necessary to know 
exactly who are the consumers with whom consumer i makes dealings, what is the 
time order of these dealings, what are the amounts traded in each case, and so on. 
For the same reasons, even if one can predict that the trading process will 
eventually come to an end when the marginal rate of substitution is the same for all 
consumers, for in that case no weakly advantageous bargain is left to be exploited 
by anybody, at this stage of the analysis, failing further assumptions, one can 
predict neither the final allocation nor, as a consequence, the final rate of exchange 
of the two commodities for one another. 
4.2 Marshall’s Model of an Edgeworth Box Economy 
According to Marshall, this sort of indeterminacy is intrinsic to any trading process 
involving two commodities proper, that is, to any ‘system of barter’ (Marshall 
1961a, p. 334). These kinds of trading processes are examined in greater detail in 
Appendix F of the Principles, which, as already mentioned, is specifically devoted 
to the analysis of a ‘system of barter’. 
To begin with, Marshall makes the simplifying assumption that only two 
traders be involved in the barter process, thereby turning the economy under 
question into an Edgeworth Box economy, ℰ {=EB (ℝ })),(, 2 12 =+ ⋅ iiiu ω . The traders’ 
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characteristics satisfy all the assumptions made in section 2, with the further 
restriction, introduced here for reasons similar to those already explained in 
discussing Walras’ model, that the second-order pure partial derivatives of the 
traders’ utility functions are taken to be strictly negative. Under these conditions, 
Marshall shows, by means of numerical examples, that the barter process between 
two consumers trading ‘apples’ for ‘nuts’ may follow a number of alternative paths, 
each of which eventually terminates, 
because any terms that the one is willing to propose would be 
disadvantageous to the other. Up to this point exchange has 
increased the satisfaction on both sides, but it can do so no 
further. Equilibrium has been attained; but really it is not the 
equilibrium, it is an accidental equilibrium. (Marshall 1961a, 
p. 791; Marshall’s italics) 
Specifically, Marshall examines three alternative paths. The first one, 
characterised by a constant rate of exchange between the two commodities over the 
exchange process, stands apart from all the other possible paths, occupying a position 
which, according to Marshall, is theoretically unique, though practically irrelevant: 
There is, however, one equilibrium rate of exchange which has 
some sort of right to be called the true equilibrium rate, because 
if once hit upon would be adhered to throughout. […] This is 
then the true position of equilibrium; but there is no reason to 
suppose that it will be reached in practice.19 (Marshall 1961a, 
p. 791) 
Either one of the other two paths worked out in detail by Marshall is 
instead characterised by a variable rate of exchange between the two commodities 
over the trading process: such rate, in fact, is supposed to be monotonically increasing 
in one case, decreasing in the other. Referring to the latter two cases, deemed to be in 
some sense representative of a general pattern, Marshall concludes: 
In both these cases the exchange would have increased the 
satisfaction of both as far as it went; and when it ceased, no 
further exchange would have been possible which would not 
have diminished the satisfaction of at least one of them. In each 
case an equilibrium rate would have been reached; but it would 
be an arbitrary equilibrium. (Marshall 1961a, p. 792) 
This discussion can be formalised as follows. Let 2,1=i . Assuming 
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For Marshall, any allocation EB
C Cx ∈  may represent an ‘equilibrium’, 
and any corresponding common marginal rate of substitution between the two 
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commodities, CCii pxMRS 121 )( = , for 2,1=i , may represent an ‘equilibrium rate of 
exchange’ between the commodities concerned. But, in general, any such 
allocation (respectively, rate) would be an ‘arbitrary’ or ‘accidental’ equilibrium 
allocation (respectively, rate). According to Marshall, only a rate of exchange 
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would qualify as a ‘true equilibrium rate’.20 In the above quoted passage Marshall 
seems to imply that there exists exactly one such rate. Yet, while the stated 
conditions are sufficient for a ‘true equilibrium rate’ to exist in ℰ EB , they are not 
sufficient for uniqueness: in this respect, therefore, Marshall appears to be over-
optimistic. Finally, since 
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which is nothing but Jevons’ well-known equilibrium condition (Jevons 1879, 
pp. 142-3). 
These conclusions would not change if the economy consisted of any 
larger, but finite, number of traders.21 For, according to Marshall, the 
indeterminacy of the final (or equilibrium) rate of exchange between the two 
commodities, equal to the marginal rate of substitution common to all traders in 
the final allocation, does not essentially depend on the number of traders in the 
economy. Rather, 
[the] uncertainty of the rate at which the equilibrium is reached 
depends indirectly on the fact that one commodity is being 
bartered for another instead of being sold for money. For, since 
money is a general purchasing medium, there are likely to be 
many dealers who can conveniently take in, or give out, large 
supplies of it; and this tends to steady the market. (Marshall 
1961a, p. 793) 
As far as the indeterminacy problem is concerned, the fundamental 
property of money, which is not generally shared by commodities proper, is that, 
owing to its large supply and general diffusion among the traders, ‘its marginal 
utility is practically constant’.22 In Marshall’s terminology, the theory dealing with 
those trading processes in which one side of each bargain is in the form of ‘money’, 
the other being in the form of a commodity proper, is called the ‘theory of buying 
and selling’. Towards the end of Appendix F of the Principles, Marshall contrasts 
the ‘theory of buying and selling’ with the ‘theory of barter’, stressing what he 
regards as the essential difference between the two: 
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The real distinction then between the theory of buying and 
selling and that of barter is that in the former it generally is, and 
in the latter it generally is not, right to assume that the stock of 
one of the things which is in the market and ready to be 
exchanged for the other is very large and in many hands; and 
that therefore its marginal utility is practically constant. 
(Marshall 1961a, p. 793) 
In view of this, going back to the Edgeworth Box example already 
discussed in the first part of the Appendix, but assuming now that one of the two 
commodities traded (‘nuts’) shares the essential properties of money (large 
supply and general diffusion, hence ‘constant marginal utility’), while the other 
(‘apples’) does not, Marshall categorically asserts that, independently of the path 
followed by the exchange process, ‘[i]n this case the bargaining must issue in [a 
determinate outcome]’: precisely, what turns out to be determined in this case is 
both the total quantity traded of the commodity proper (‘apples’) and the final 
rate of exchange between the two commodities. The latter, being uniquely 
determined, can legitimately be said in this case to represent ‘the equilibrium’ 
rate, rather than simply ‘an’ (or ‘an accidental’ or ‘an arbitrary’) ‘equilibrium’ 
rate; but it might also be legitimately qualified as ‘the true equilibrium rate’, 
because it does satisfy the condition set out by Marshall (1961a, p. 333) for so 
qualifying as a rate of exchange. What instead remains undetermined, even in this 
special case, is the total quantity traded of the money-like commodity (‘nuts’), 
which depends on the specific path followed by the trading process.23 
Let us now verify whether the results allegedly reached by Marshall in 
the framework of his particular example actually hold in the formal model of a 
special Edgeworth Box economy, ℰ =mEB ℰ mpe ,22× , where commodity 1 (‘apples’) is a 
commodity proper, while commodity 2 (‘nuts’) is a money-like commodity, whose 
marginal utility is assumed to be constant (the superscript m in both ℰ mEB  and ℰ mpe ,22×  
is there to remind the reader of the money-like nature of one of the two commodities). 
In view of the money-like character ascribed to commodity 2, it is natural to take 
that commodity as the numeraire in this model, so that 12 ≡p . As to commodity 1, 
we shall see that many different concepts of the price of commodity 1 in terms of 
commodity 2 need to be employed in order to formalise Marshall’s approach: 
namely, for each consumer i, both a ‘demand price’ and a ‘supply price’ of 
commodity 1 in terms of commodity 2 will be defined in the following; 
moreover, an ‘equilibrium price’ concept will be needed as well (but the latter, as 
already seen, may require further qualifications, for it may be either ‘true’ or 
‘arbitrary’ and ‘accidental’, as the case may be). In any case, the price of 
commodity 1 in terms of commodity 2 will always be denoted by 1p  in what 
follows, with additional subscripts or superscripts specifying the particular price 
concept at issue. 
Marshall’s ‘constant marginal utility of money’ assumption can be 
formally rendered by assuming consumer i’s utility function to be quasi-linear in 
commodity 2, that is: 
iiiiii xxvxxu 21121 )(),( += , 2,1=i , 
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where the constant marginal utility of the money-like commodity has been 
normalised to 1, that is, ==
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. As we have seen, Marshall’s main empirical justification 
for adopting the ‘constant marginal utility assumption’ is that money is in large and 
general supply. It is difficult to formalise this empirical condition in an Edgeworth 
Box economy. In any case, I shall assume that consumer i’s endowment of the 
money-like commodity is ‘sufficiently large’, that is, i2ω  is no less than a positive 
number 0>im , to be specified in due time, for 2,1=i . 
Marshall’s assumptions concerning the marginal utility function of a 
commodity proper can be rendered by means of the following restrictions on the 
partial derivatives of consumer i’s utility function with respect to the quantity 
consumed of commodity 1: 
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so that the marginal rate of substitution of commodity 2 for commodity 1, or the 
reservation price of commodity 1 in terms of commodity 2, only depends on the 
quantity consumed of commodity 1. The latter, as we shall see, is the property of the 
traders’ characteristics driving Marshall’s results in his Edgeworth Box model: for 
this reason it will be referred to as ‘Marshall’s fundamental property’ in the sequel.25 
Drawing on this ‘fundamental property’, I shall now proceed to derive 
Marshall’s inverse individual demand and supply correspondences relative to the 
Edgeworth Box model, from which Marshall’s direct individual demand and supply 
functions can eventually be obtained. It should be stressed that such demand and 
supply functions are 1) entirely different from the Walrasian ones, and 2) essential 
for understanding Marshall’s interpretation of both the equilibration process and the 
equilibrium concept, which in turn should not be confused with that of Walras. Hicks 
(1946) and Donald Walker (1969) are interested in explaining the characteristic 
features of Marshall’s analysis of the equilibration process, but are unable to correctly 
distinguish the Marshallian demand and supply functions from the Walrasian ones. 
Boulding (1945), Hal Varian (1987 and 1992), and Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green 
(1995), on the contrary, are uninterested in the peculiarities of Marshall’s analysis of 
disequilibrium and hence they are also uninterested in correctly identifying the 
differences between the two types of demand and supply functions. 
Let { }iiiii xxd 11111 ,0max),( ωω −=  be consumer i’s net demand proper for 
commodity 1 and { }iiiii xxs 11111 ,,0min),( ωω −=  his net supply of commodity 1, 
for 01 ≥ix , 2,1=i . If iix 11 ω> , then 0),( 111 >iii xd ω  and consumer i is a net 
buyer of commodity 1; hence )()( 11121 iiii xvxMRS ′=  can be interpreted as a 
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buyer’s reservation price, or demand price, that is, as the maximum quantity of 
commodity 2 that consumer i is willing to pay in exchange for one unit of 
commodity 1, when his present consumption of commodity 1 is ix1 . If iix 11 ω< , 
then 0),( 111 >iii xs ω  and consumer i is a net seller of commodity 1; hence 
)()( 11121 iiii xvxMRS ′=  can be interpreted as a seller’s reservation price, or supply 
price, that is, as the minimum quantity of commodity 2 that consumer i is willing to 
receive in exchange for one unit of commodity 1, when his present consumption of 
commodity 1 is ix1 . Finally, if iix 11 ω= , then 0),(),( 111111 == iiiiii sd ωωωω  and 
consumer i is neither a net buyer nor a net seller of commodity 1, so that 
)()( 11121 iiii vMRS ωω ′=  can be interpreted as both the maximum quantity of 
commodity 2 that consumer i is willing to pay and the minimum quantity of 
commodity 2 that consumer i is willing to receive in exchange for one unit of 
commodity 1, when his present consumption of commodity 1 is i1ω . 
Hence, given ),0(),( 1111 iiii xs ωω ∈ , let =)),(( 1111 iiisi xsp ω  
)()),(( 1111111 iiiiiii xvxsv ′=−′ ωω  be consumer i’s supply price of commodity 1 
when his consumption of that commodity is ),( 11111 iiiii xsx ωω −= ; similarly, 
given 0),( 111 ≥iii xd ω , let =+′= )),(()),(( 111111111 iiiiiiiidi xdvxdp ωωω )( 11 ii xv′ be 
consumer i’s demand price of commodity 1 when his consumption of that 
commodity is ),( 11111 iiiii xdx ωω += . The correspondence [ ]→isip 11 ,0: ω ℝ + , 
mapping consumer i’s net supplies of commodity 1 into consumer i’s supply prices 
of commodity 1, is called consumer i’s Marshallian inverse supply correspondence 
of commodity 1. The correspondence )(1 ⋅sip  is defined as follows: 
[ ])(,0)( 1111 iiisi vsp ω′= , for 01 =is ; )()( 11111 iiiisi svsp −′= ω , for ),0( 11 iis ω∈ ; 
[ )∞′= ),0()( 111 iisi vsp , for iis 11 ω= . Given the assumptions on )(1 ⋅iv  and its 
derivatives, the restriction of )(1 ⋅sip  to the domain ),0( 1iω  is a strictly increasing 
continuous function. Similarly, the correspondence [ ]→idip 11 ,0: ω ℝ + , mapping 
consumer i’s net demands for commodity 1 into consumer i’s demand prices of 
commodity 1, is called consumer i’s Marshallian inverse demand correspondence 
for commodity 1. The correspondence )(1 ⋅dip  is defined as follows: 
[ )∞′= ),()( 1111 iiidi vdp ω , for 01 =id ; )()( 11111 iiiidi dvdp +′= ω , for 01 >id . Given 
the assumptions on )(⋅iv  and its derivatives, the restriction of )(1 ⋅dip  to the domain 
),0( ∞  is a strictly decreasing continuous function. 
By first taking the inverses of the previous two functions, and then suitably 
extending such inverses to cover the whole price domain, one gets the Marshallian 
direct supply and demand functions. Namely, consumer i’s Marshallian direct 
supply function of commodity 1, mapping consumer i’s supply prices into net 
supplies of commodity 1, is the continuous function :1is ℝ [ ]i1,0 ω→+  defined as 
follows: 0)( 11 =sii ps , for [ ))(,0 111 iisi vp ω′∈ ; )()()( 111111 siiisii pvps −′−= ω , for 
[ ))0(),( 1111 iiisi vvp ′′∈ ω ; isii ps 111 )( ω= , for [ )∞′∈ ),0(11 isi vp . The function )(1 ⋅is  is 
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non-decreasing in sip1 , and strictly increasing for [ ])0(),( 1111 iiisi vvp ′′∈ ω . Similarly, 
consumer i’s Marshallian direct demand function for commodity 1, mapping 
consumer i’s demand prices into net demands of commodity 1, is the continuous 
function :1id ℝ [ )∞→++ ,0  defined as follows: 0)( 11 =dii pd , for [ )∞′∈ ),( 111 iidi vp ω ; 
i
d
ii
d
ii pvpd 111111 )()()( ω−′= − , for ( ])(,0 111 iidi vp ω′∈ . The function )(1 ⋅id  is non-
increasing in dip1 , and strictly decreasing for ( ])(,0 111 iidi vp ω′∈ . 
Now, assuming consumer i’s preferences to be such that i’s potential 
expenditure on commodity 1 is bounded above, the restriction on consumer i’s 
minimum endowment of the money-like commodity can be specified as follows: 
{ }iidi
id
ii ddpm 111
01
2 )(sup
>
=≥ω , 2,1=i . 
Now let )()( 2
1 1111 ∑ == i
d
ii
d pdpd , for did pp 11 = , 2,1=i , and ( )∞∈ ,01dp , 
and let )()( 2
1 1111 ∑ == i
s
ii
s psps , for si
s pp 11 = , 2,1=i , and [ )∞∈ ,01sp . The 
functions )(1 ⋅d  and )(1 ⋅s , arrived at by aggregating the individual demand and 
supply functions over all consumers, are called the Marshallian aggregate demand 
and supply functions for commodity 1, respectively. Let { })(max 11max1 ii
i
d vp ω′= , 
{ })(min 11min1 iii
s vp ω′=  and { })0(max 1max1 i
i
s vp ′= , 2,1=i . Then the function )(1 ⋅d  is 
non-increasing in dp1 , and strictly decreasing for ( ]dd pp max11 ,0∈ , while the function 
)(1 ⋅s  is non-decreasing in sp1 , and strictly increasing for [ ]sss ppp max1min11 ,∈ . 
Further, provided that consumers’ preferences are not identical at the initial 
allocation, sd pp min1max1 > . Hence, there must exist a unique price 
),( max1min1111 dssMdMM ppppp ∈==  such that 
)()( 1111 MM pspd =      (4') 
or 
0)()( 1111 =− MM pspd      (4'') 
where Mp1  may be called the Marshallian equilibrium price of commodity 1 in 
terms of commodity 2, while the common value )()( 1111 MM pspd = , synthetically 
denoted by )( 11 Mpq , may be called the Marshallian equilibrium total traded 
quantity of commodity 1 or, for short, the equilibrium quantity of commodity 1. 
Equation (4'') closely resembles the Walrasian equilibrium equation (3'), 
embodying the market-clearing condition for commodity 1, any solution of which 
represents a Walrasian equilibrium price of commodity 1 in terms of commodity 2, 
Wp12 . But, all similarities notwithstanding, the interpretation of equation (4''), and 
specifically of the associated Marshallian equilibrium price concept, is altogether 
different from that of equation (3'), and specifically of the associated Walrasian 
equilibrium price concept. 
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As a matter of fact, in spite of its appearance, equation (4'') (or, for that 
matter, equation (4')) is not a market-clearing equation; similarly, in spite of its 
apparent role, Mp1  is not a market-clearing price. It is certainly true that, if the two 
consumers should agree to carry out all their trades at a constant rate of exchange 
equal to Mp1 , then the market for commodity 1 would ‘clear’ at that rate, in the sense 
that, at the end of the trading process, the total quantity traded of commodity 1 would 
be equal to both the quantity demanded and the quantity supplied, that is, to the 
common value )()()( 111111 MMM pspdpq == . But typically the two consumers will 
not carry out their trades at the constant rate Mp1 ; and yet, even if different trades 
take place at different rates, at the end of the process the total quantity traded of 
commodity 1 will still be equal to the common value )( 11 Mpq . But then, if the rate 
Mp1  does not play any exclusive market-clearing role, since the market ‘clears’, in 
the sense specified, also with a non-constant sequence of rates of exchange, what is 
exactly the role played by Mp1 ? And why does the Marshallian equilibrium total 
traded quantity of commodity 1 invariably equal )( 11 Mpq ? 
When the two consumers have already cumulatively traded a quantity 1qˆ  
of commodity 1, such that [ ))(,0ˆ 111 Mpqq ∈ , there still exists a positive difference 
between the demand and the supply price of commodity 1 corresponding to 1qˆ , that 
is 0)ˆ()ˆ( 1111 >− qpqp sd ; hence there still is room for a weakly advantageous 
marginal trade between the two consumers, at any rate of exchange [ ])ˆ(),ˆ(ˆ 11111 qpqpp ds∈ , or even in general for a finite trade, under suitable restrictions 
on the allowable rates of exchange, depending on the amount already traded, the 
amount to be traded, and the graphs of the Marshallian demand and supply 
functions of commodity 1 for 11 qˆq > . 
Given the quasi-linearity in commodity 2 of the utility functions, 
whatever the allowable rate of exchange between the two commodities at which 
any marginal (or allowable finite) trade occurs, the Marshallian demand and 
supply functions of commodity 1 are unaffected. Hence the Marshallian 
equilibrium price and quantity of commodity 1 are independent of the path 
followed by the exchange process; as a consequence, the total traded quantity of 
commodity 1 will always equal )( 11 Mpq  when the exchange process eventually 
ceases, while the marginal rate of exchange at which the last marginal trade occurs 
will always be Mp1 . Hence, as Marshall correctly suggests, the rate of exchange 
Mp1  ought to be interpreted as the final rate to which the sequence of the rates at 
which the consumers have traded during the trading process necessarily converges, 
along a path which may exhibit no regularity other than the stated convergence; the 
total quantity of commodity 1 traded by the consumers, )( 11 Mpq , ought instead to 
be interpreted as the quantity of commodity 1 to which the monotonically 
increasing sequence of the quantities cumulatively traded by the consumers 
during the exchange process necessarily converges. Finally, the total quantity of 
the money-like commodity 2 cumulatively traded by the consumers at the end of 
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the trading process remains undetermined, its final value being however 
necessarily confined to the interval 

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where 2,1, =ji , i is s.t. sii pv min111 )( =′ ω , while is j s.t. djj pv max111 )( =′ ω . 
Hence, in Marshall’s model of an Edgeworth Box economy with a money-
like commodity there is no counterpart of equation (3''), appearing in Walras’ 
model, where it provides the market-clearing condition for commodity 2; and, for 
the same reason, in Marshall’s model there is nothing comparable to Walras’ Law, 
even if, due to the bilateral character of any exchange, the total value of sales must 
always equal that of purchases for each consumer, hence for the whole economy. 
4.3 Marshall’s ‘Temporary Equilibrium’ Model 
The formal analysis developed above supports the conclusions informally reached by 
Marshall in his Edgeworth Box artificial example with a money-like commodity 
(‘nuts’) and a commodity proper (‘apples’). It is obvious, however, that this is just a 
provisional result for Marshall, whose aim evidently is to apply his method of 
analysis to a more realistic economy, with an arbitrary finite number of traders and 
commodities. Yet, while Marshall’s objectives are indeed quite general, the analytical 
tools at his disposal remain quite limited: in fact, in developing his analysis of the so-
called ‘temporary equilibrium of demand and supply’ in Chapter II of Book V of the 
Principles, while explicitly referring to an exchange economy with any finite number 
of traders and commodities, Marshall puts forward (or, more precisely, informally 
illustrates) a model where he explicitly takes into account an arbitrary finite number 
of traders, but only two commodities at a time. As a consequence, the model 
illustrated in Chapter II of Book V, henceforth referred to as Marshall’s ‘temporary 
equilibrium’ model, can only represent a very partial generalisation of the Edgeworth 
Box model of Appendix F, with the following features: the number of traders 
increases to 2>I ; the number of commodities formally taken into consideration still 
remains 2=L ; the money-like commodity becomes ‘money’ proper, that is, the 
counterpart of any trade, or the ‘general purchasing medium’ in the economy, whose 
marginal utility is assumed to be constant (Marshall 1961a, pp. 335-6, 793); the other 
commodity is explicitly taken to be a consumer good. 
Marshall’s ‘temporary equilibrium’ model applies to an economy 
ℰ {,2 =× mIpe (ℝ })),(, 12 Iiiiu =+ ⋅ ω  with 2>I , where commodity 1 is a consumer good, 
commodity 2 is money, and )(⋅iu  is quasi-linear in commodity 2. Even if, 
formally, the model can be said to apply to an entire pure-exchange economy with 
the specified characteristics, from a substantial point of view it actually describes 
the functioning of a single market, namely, the market where a given consumer 
good is exchanged for money. This simply means that the model under discussion, 
though formally constructed as a general equilibrium model, actually provides the 
foundations of Marshall’s partial equilibrium analysis of an isolated market. This 
ambiguity is not devoid of consequences. 
Let us consider, in particular, the ‘constant marginal utility of money’ 
assumption. In passing from the Edgeworth Box model with a money-like 
commodity to the ‘temporary equilibrium’ model with money, Marshall further 
specifies the conditions under which the ‘constant marginal utility of money’ 
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assumption is empirically justified and substantially satisfied. In fact, to the already 
mentioned characteristic property of money of being in large supply and general 
use, Marshall now adds another condition, not concerning money as such, but 
rather the commodity for which money is exchanged: 
[The ‘constant marginal utility of money’] assumption is 
justifiable with regard to most of the market dealings with 
which we are practically concerned. When a person buys 
anything for his own consumption, he generally spends on it a 
small part of his total resources; while when he buys it for the 
purposes of trade, he looks to re-selling it, and therefore his 
potential resources are not diminished. In either case there is no 
appreciable change in his willingness to part with money. 
(Marshall 1961a, pp. 335-6) 
Now, of the two conditions that, according to Marshall, justify this 
assumption in the context of his ‘temporary equilibrium’ model, the first can be 
taken care of in the same way as before, by fixing a minimum endowment of 
money, im , for each Ii ,...,1= . But the second cannot be formally accommodated 
into the model of an economy with only two commodities, one of which is money, 
for in such a model it is meaningless to suppose that each trader i’s expenditure on 
the only consumer good existing in the economy represents ‘a small part of his total 
resources’. This is just an instance of the difficulties one necessarily encounters in 
trying to make formally precise Marshall’s rich, but vague, empirical insights, 
while striving to keep the formal model as faithful as possible to Marshall’s original 
presentation. 
Similar remarks apply, in particular, to the idea of formalising the 
behaviour of those dealers or middlemen, supposedly buying with a view to re-
selling, who are incidentally mentioned by Marshall in the passage quoted above: 
for the formal treatment of that sort of behaviour, with its obvious strategic 
connotations, would require the use of a conceptual framework and an analytical 
apparatus which are entirely alien to Marshall’s capabilities and interests. Hence, in 
the following, I shall rule out all strategic considerations, assuming instead that all 
traders engage in bilateral bargains, satisfying the following conditions: each 
bargain is regarded as a self-contained transaction by the two traders involved in it, 
so that each trader, in deciding whether to get engaged in a bargain, takes into 
account only the immediate effects of that bargain on his utility.26 On top of this 
assumption, which is specific to the ‘temporary equilibrium’ model, due to the 
existence in this model of a number of traders greater than two, I have to confirm 
here the same two assumptions already encountered in Marshall’s Edgeworth Box 
model: precisely, in conformity with Marshall’s verbal description of the exchange 
process, I shall assume that an individual bargain will only take place if it is weakly 
advantageous for the two traders involved in it, while no trader will stop trading as 
long as he can increase his utility by so doing. 
Under the above assumptions, the generalisation of the model of an 
Edgeworth Box economy with a money-like commodity, ℰ =mEB ℰ mpe ,22× , to the 
‘temporary equilibrium’ model of a pure-exchange economy with I  consumers, 
ℰ mIpe ,2× , is immediate: in effect, all the analysis leading to equations (4') and (4'') is 
independent of the number of traders in the economy, and consequently applies 
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without change to the new context, except that now the number of traders in the 
economy is 2>I , instead of just 2 as before. 
Yet, in spite of their formal similarity, it is nonetheless convenient to 
distinguish between the two cases: namely, when referring to the economy ℰ mIpe ,2× , 
rather than to the economy ℰ mEB , I shall rewrite equations (4') and (4'') as: 
)()( ,11,11 MIIMII pspd =      (5') 
or 
0)()( ,11
,
11 =−
MIIMII pspd     (5'') 
it being understood that, in deriving equations (5') and (5''), the Marshallian 
aggregate demand and supply functions for commodity 1 are, respectively, 
∑
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(rather than 2=I , as in the derivation of equations (4') and (4''). Further, MIp ,1  is 
the Marshallian ‘temporary equilibrium’ money price of commodity 1, while 
)()()( ,11,11,11 MIIMIIMII pspdpq ==  is the Marshallian ‘temporary equilibrium’ 
quantity of commodity 1. 
As we shall see, Marshall’s final interpretation of equation (5') and (5'') is 
essentially the same as that of equation (4') and (4''). Yet, Marshall’s claims are not 
entirely justified: for, even if equations (5') and (5'') are formally almost identical to 
equations (4') and (4''), their interpretation cannot be exactly the same as before. 
To clarify this point, let us first recall the essential features of Marshall’s 
original presentation. Marshall, as it is customary for him, develops his ‘temporary 
equilibrium’ model by means of an example. In this case, Marshall’s illustration is 
taken ‘from a corn market in a country town’, where ‘corn […] of the same quality’ 
is traded against ‘money’, the former being measured in quarters and the latter in 
shillings (Marshall 1961a, p. 332). Hence, in the light of Marshall’s example, 
commodities 1 and 2 above should be interpreted as ‘corn’ and ‘money’, 
respectively, while the price of commodity 1 in terms of commodity 2 should be 
interpreted as the ‘money price of corn’. 
In his illustration, Marshall summarises the relevant aggregate ‘facts’ 
concerning the corn market by means of the following ‘table’ (Marshall 1961a, 
p. 333): 
 
At the price Holders will be willing 
to sell 
Buyers will be willing 
to buy 
   
37s. 1000 quarters 600 quarters 
36s.  700    ”         700       "      
35s.  600    ”         900       "      
 
From a discussion of these ‘facts’, Marshall draws the following 
provisional conclusion: 
The price of 36s. has thus some claim to be called the true 
equilibrium price: because if it were fixed on at the beginning, 
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and adhered to throughout, it would exactly equate demand and 
supply (i.e. the amount which buyers were willing to purchase 
at that price would be just equal to that for which sellers were 
willing to take that price); and because every dealer who has a 
perfect knowledge of the circumstances of the market expects 
that price to be established. If he sees the price differing much 
from 36s. he expects that a change will come before long, and 
by anticipating it he helps it to come quickly. (Marshall 1961a, 
pp. 333-4) 
Here Marshall offers two different reasons for justifying the statement that 
‘the price of 36s.’ is ‘the true equilibrium price’. What is at first sight disconcerting 
is that neither argument is really consistent with Marshall’s approach: for the first 
ambiguously oscillates between a Jevonsian and a Walrasian approach, while the 
second assumes an amount of knowledge on the part of some dealers that is wholly 
at variance with both Marshall’s vision and theory. 
The first argument has an explicitly conditional form: if some extreme 
form of ‘Jevons’ Law of Indifference’ were to hold, implying the constancy of the 
money price of commodity 1 over the whole trading process, assumed to be time-
consuming, rather than simply across the different trades taking place at one and 
the same instant, then ‘the price of 36s.’ would clear the market for that 
commodity. This argument might appear to suggest a distinctly Walrasian 
interpretation of both equation (5') (or (5'')) and the price equilibrium concept 
implicit in it. But there is something unconvincing in this Walrasian reading of the 
price equilibrium concept: on the one hand, as we already know, Marshall does not 
believe in the truth of the premise of the proposed conditional statement, which 
sounds therefore as openly counterfactual in character;27 on the other hand, as can 
be seen by the second half of the sentence between parentheses, Marshall is far 
from accepting Walras’ price-taking assumption, on which the Walrasian 
interpretation of the price equilibrium concept essentially rests.28 
Marshall’s second argument is even more questionable: for if an inside 
dealer had a ‘perfect knowledge of the circumstances of the market’, whatever the 
exact meaning of this expression, he would try to exploit such knowledge 
strategically, as Marshall himself seems to imply in the last sentence of the quoted 
passage. But then that dealer’s behaviour could not be the one predicted on the 
basis of Marshall’s own simple non-strategic theory, as put forward in both 
Appendix F and Chapter II of Book V of the Principles, so that ‘the price of 36s.’ 
could not be the equilibrium price, after all, and the alleged stabilising effect of 
speculation would be far from proven, contrary to Marshall’s implication.29 
Now, if Marshall’s justifications of his own ‘temporary equilibrium’ 
concept were really based on the above grounds, Marshall’s efforts to build an 
original equilibrium model would be misplaced or self-defeating: in effect, if the 
proposed justification were the first, with its Walrasian flavour, Marshall’s model 
should be discarded in favour of the much less cumbersome model put forward by 
Walras; if, instead, the proposed justification were the second, with its game-
theoretic flavour, Marshall’s model should be discarded since it would be wholly 
unable to cope with the issues at stake. 
But really it is not Marshall’s intention to support his ‘temporary 
equilibrium’ notion by means of either one of the arguments tentatively put forward 
in the quoted passage: in fact, in the immediately following sentence, Marshall 
himself takes care to disavow them both. As to the second argument, based on the 
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supposition that some dealers may possess a ‘perfect knowledge’ of the market 
conditions, he writes: 
It is not indeed necessary for our argument that any dealers 
should have a thorough knowledge of the circumstances of the 
market. (Marshall 1961a, p. 334) 
As to the first, based on the joint use of one extreme version of ‘Jevons’ 
Law of Indifference’ and the market-clearing condition, Marshall explains that, 
precisely because the dealers, far from being perfectly informed, actually have a 
very limited, or even grossly mistaken, knowledge of the circumstances of the 
market, a number of bilateral bargains will be struck at prices different from the 
equilibrium one. Yet, according to Marshall, in spite of all such trades occurring 
at non-equilibrium prices, the market will tend to close on a price not far from the 
equilibrium price (36s.), while the total amount of corn traded will eventually 
approximate the equilibrium quantity (700 quarters). Specifically, Marshall 
writes: 
Many of the buyers may perhaps underrate the willingness of 
the sellers to sell, with the effect that for some time the price 
rules at the highest level at which any buyers can be found; and 
thus 500 quarters may be sold before the price sinks below 37s. 
But afterwards the price must begin to fall and the result will 
still probably be that 200 more quarters will be sold, and the 
market will close on a price of about 36s. For when 700 
quarters have been sold, no seller will be anxious to dispose of 
any more except at a higher price than 36s., and no buyer will 
be anxious to purchase any more except at a lower price than 
36s. (Marshall 1961a, p. 334) 
A similar reasoning would apply, mutatis mutandis, to the sellers’ side of 
the market, should the sellers initially underrate the willingness of the buyers to 
buy (ibidem). I have here a distinctly non-Walrasian equilibration process, since 
out-of-equilibrium trades are explicitly allowed for, though not formally 
modelled. And yet the process is said to converge to a well-determined price of 
corn in terms of money and a well-determined total traded quantity of corn, 
where such price and quantity incidentally coincide with the Walrasian 
equilibrium values. Once again, as he had already done in the context of the 
Edgeworth Box economy, Marshall explains that also in this case the 
determinateness of equilibrium crucially depends on the ‘constant marginal utility 
of money’ assumption (Marshall 1961a, p. 334). 
But is Marshall justified in supposing that the ‘constant marginal utility of 
money’ assumption is sufficient for granting equilibrium determinateness in a pure-
exchange economy with many traders, ℰ mIpe ,2×  with 2>I , as it was in an 
Edgeworth Box economy with a money-like commodity, ℰ mEB ? The answer is: not 
quite. 
In fact, in the model of an Edgeworth Box economy with a money-like 
commodity, the sharp result which has been obtained concerning Mp1 , the 
Marshallian equilibrium price of commodity 1 in terms of commodity 2, crucially 
depends on the existence of only two traders in the economy: for in that case the 
marginal rate of exchange at which the last marginal trade occurs necessarily 
coincides with both the marginal demand price of the only marginal buyer, 
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))(( 111 Md pqp , and the marginal supply price of the only marginal seller, 
))(( 111 Ms pqp ; hence it also necessarily coincides with Mp1 , which can therefore be 
legitimately interpreted as the final rate to which the sequence of the rates at which 
the traders have traded during the exchange process necessarily converges. 
But in Marshall’s ‘temporary equilibrium’ model there are more than two 
traders in the economy; hence, in general, not only might there exist more than one 
marginal buyer or seller, but there might also be some sellers who are not marginal, 
in the sense that the minimum supply prices at which their Marshallian direct 
supply functions become perfectly price-inelastic are less than MIp ,1 . Under such 
circumstances, however, we can no longer be sure that the marginal price at which 
the last marginal trade occurs necessarily coincides with MIp ,1 : whether or not this 
holds true depends on the path followed by the exchange process, specifically on 
the order of the matchings between pairs of traders, that is, on something on which 
Marshall’s theory has nothing to say. In Marshall’s ‘temporary equilibrium’ model, 
therefore, while the total quantity of commodity 1 traded in the market will still 
certainly converge to the Marshallian ‘temporary equilibrium’ quantity, )( ,11 MIpq , 
it is no longer true that the sequence of the money prices of commodity 1 at which 
the traders buy and sell that commodity during the trading process necessarily 
converges to the Marshallian ‘temporary equilibrium’ price, MIp ,1 . 
4.4 Marshall’s Pure-Exchange Models: Limitations and Extensions 
While Marshall’s model of the Edgeworth Box economy is obviously 
propaedeutical to his ‘temporary equilibrium’ model, the latter is in turn 
propaedeutical to his normal equilibrium models, which absorb by far the largest 
part of Marshall’s attention in Book V of the Principles and can rightly be regarded 
as the crowning of the Marshallian theory of value. Yet it would be wrong to 
underrate the role of Marshall’s pure-exchange models, for they provide the 
foundations upon which the whole of Marshall’s price theory is built, fixing at the 
same time the boundaries within which it can hope to expand.30 As a matter of fact, 
unlike many of his followers and interpreters, Marshall himself is well aware of the 
fundamental role played by his pure-exchange models in the overall structure of his 
thought, even if he is apparently willing to acknowledge it in private 
correspondence only. For instance, in reproaching Edgeworth (1891a) for wrongly 
bringing a charge of indeterminacy against his model of barter with a money-like 
commodity, Marshall (1961b, p. 797) does not hesitate to assert that, if the ‘error’ 
mistakenly pointed out by Edgeworth were in effect true, it ‘would justly shake the 
credit of a very great part of his [that is, Marshall’s] book’. 
In his pure-exchange, two-commodity models Marshall wants to show how 
an equilibrium comes to be established as the final outcome of a realistic process of 
exchange in ‘real’ time, where trades can actually take place at out-of-equilibrium 
rates of exchange or prices. This programme inevitably raises the issue of 
equilibrium determinacy. Marshall’s solution, as we have seen, consists in 
imposing some related restrictions on both the traders’ utility functions, which are 
assumed to be quasi-linear in one of the two commodities, and the nature of the 
commodities themselves, one of which is interpreted as a money-like commodity or 
money tout court. By so proceeding, Marshall solves the equilibrium determinacy 
problem in the Edgeworth Box model with a money-like commodity, in the special 
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sense specified in subsection 4.2, and almost solves it in the ‘temporary 
equilibrium’ model, as explained in subsection 4.3. 
But, at the same time, Marshall inexorably restrains the scope of his 
analysis: for his suggested solution of the equilibrium indeterminacy problem only 
applies when no more than one commodity proper is explicitly accounted for in the 
model, so that the only unknowns to be determined boil down to the money price 
and the quantity traded of that single commodity proper (as we have seen, not even 
the quantity of money traded in equilibrium can be determined in Marshall’s 
model). As a matter of fact, Marshall’s approach can be formally extended to a 
multi-market pure-exchange economy, where an arbitrary finite number of 
commodities are traded for money. Yet, in such a generalised context, ‘Marshall’s 
fundamental property’, on which Marshall’s results in his pure-exchange models 
with only one commodity proper crucially depend, can only be preserved if one is 
willing to assume that the traders’ utility functions are not only quasi-linear in 
money, but also additively separable in all their arguments, that is, all commodities 
proper and money; this means, however, that the multi-market economy actually 
turns out to be made up of a number of separate markets, lacking any essential 
interrelation and behaving as if they were isolated from each other.31 
The above conclusion allows us to dispose also of Hicks’ surreptitious 
attempt, hinted at in the introduction to this paper, to extend Marshall’s ‘ingenious 
argument’ to a truly Walrasian general equilibrium theory, overcoming the limits of 
‘Marshall’s theory of temporary equilibrium’. In effect, towards the end of his Note 
to Chapter IX of Value and Capital, Hicks proves to be aware of the severe 
limitations of Marshall’s original argument, among which the neglect of all 
‘interactions between markets’ stands out. Then Hicks raises the following 
question: 
For our purposes, it is desirable, if we can, to remove these 
limitations. Can we remove them without the whole structure 
falling to the ground? (Hicks 1946, p. 129) 
Hicks’ answer is that the desired extension to a multi-market economy is 
indeed possible, provided that the ‘income effects’ induced by trading at ‘false 
prices’ can be neglected. Yet, our analysis suggests a different, and much less 
favourable answer: for, in an economy characterised by many interrelated markets, 
the chief effect of trading at ‘false prices’ does not consist in a mere ‘redistribution 
of wealth’; rather, it has to do with rationing, quantitative constraints, and the 
ensuing spill-over effects, that is, with consequences on which Walras’ (or, for that 
matter, Marshall’s) theory has literally nothing to say. Hence, contrary to Hicks’ 
wishful thinking, the whole structure would indeed fall to the ground. 
We can conclude, therefore, that there is no way to extend to a multi-
commodity world, made up of many interrelated markets, the results achieved by 
Marshall within his one-commodity world, consisting in the isolated market where 
the only commodity proper explicitly contemplated by the model is traded for 
money: Marshall’s analysis remains necessarily confined to the partial equilibrium 
framework dictated by his explanatory aims and consequent choice of assumptions, 
while Walras’ general equilibrium analysis stands well beyond reach. Of course, 
production phenomena can be brought into the picture: this is precisely what 
Marshall does by developing his normal equilibrium models, where production of a 
consumer good plays a fundamental role in explaining the functioning of the supply 
side of the market. But also in this case the partial equilibrium framework cannot be 
overcome. 
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5 Conclusions 
In this paper I have squarely faced the long-standing issue of the foundations of 
modern price theory, specifically contrasting the received view according to which 
Walras’ and Marshall’s approaches to price theory, while differing in scope, are 
basically similar in their aims, presuppositions and results. 
By focusing on a special kind of economy (the pure-exchange, two-
commodity economy), which has been formally studied by both Walras and 
Marshall with the help of similar tools, I have been able to precisely identify the 
differences between the two approaches. First, the two economists have been 
shown to differ widely from one another in the basic assumptions on which they 
ground their respective investigations of the trading process: as a matter of fact, it 
turns out that Walras’ very conception of a competitive economy is largely at 
variance with Marshall’s. Secondly, it has been shown that, starting from such 
different sets of assumptions, the two authors arrive at entirely different models of 
the pure-exchange, two-commodity economy. 
Precisely, by reducing the trading process to a purely virtual process in 
‘logical’ time, Walras arrives at a well-defined notion of ‘instantaneous’ 
equilibrium, which can easily be extended to more general contexts (such as pure-
exchange and production multi-commodity economies). On the contrary, by 
making a few further assumptions on the characteristics of the traders and the 
nature of the commodities involved, one of which must be money or a money-like 
commodity, Marshall can indeed show that a determinate (or almost determinate) 
equilibrium emerges from a process of exchange in ‘real’ time with observable out-
of-equilibrium trades; but his analysis cannot be significantly generalised beyond 
the partial equilibrium framework in which it is necessarily couched from the 
beginning. 
Hence, to conclude, our comparison between Walras’ and Marshall’s 
approaches to price theory seems to confirm that, given the requirement of 
equilibrium determinacy, there indeed exists a trade-off between realism and scope 
of the analysis: for Marshall can buy a more realistic interpretation of both the 
equilibration process and the equilibrium construct than Walras, only at the cost of 
giving up Walras’ pretence to develop a truly general analysis of a system of 
interrelated markets. 
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Notes 
 
1 During Walras’ lifetime, four successive editions of the Eléments were sent to 
press: the first one, subdivided into two instalments, appeared in 1874 and 1877; the 
second, third, and fourth editions, instead, were each published as a unitary volume in 
1889, 1896 and 1900, respectively. There was also a posthumous edition, arranged by 
Walras himself before his death and almost identical with the fourth, which was 
published in 1926; this edition, known in the past as the ‘quatrième édition définitive’, 
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is now more simply indicated as the fifth edition. In the following I shall chiefly refer to 
Jaffé’s English edition (Walras 1954), which is based on the fifth edition of the 
Eléments. Occasionally, however, it will be necessary to mention or quote one specific 
edition of that book. In that case, I shall refer to the variorum edition of the Eléments, 
contained in volume VIII of the Œuvres économiques complètes d’Auguste et de Léon 
Walras (Walras 1988), which allows easy comparisons among the texts of the various 
editions. 
2 During Marshall’s lifetime, eight successive editions of the Principles of 
Economics were published, from 1890 to 1920. In the following we shall refer to the so-
called Ninth (Variorum) Edition, published in 1961 with annotations by C. W. 
Guillebaud. This edition consists of two volumes: Volume I. Text, containing the text of 
the eighth edition of the Principles (Marshall 1961a); and Volume II. Notes, containing 
both the collation notes and other editorial notes by Guillebaud (Marshall 1961b). 
3 Lessons 5 to 10 immediately follow the introductory Part I of the Eléments, being 
therefore the first Lessons of that book devoted to price theory in the strict sense. 
4 While ‘Appendix F. Barter’ deals with a pure exchange, two-commodity, two-
trader economy, chapter II of Book V, ‘Temporary equilibrium of demand and supply’, 
deals with a pure exchange economy with two commodities, one of which is money, 
and an arbitrary finite number of traders. 
 It should be noted that in the first four editions of the Principles the subject-matter 
of what would later become, since the fifth edition, ‘Appendix F. Barter’ was placed at 
the end of Book V, chapter II, and was entitled ‘A Note on Barter’ (Marshall 1961b, 
p. 790). The strict logical connection between the contents of chapter II of Book V and 
Appendix F, which comes out clearly from a sequential reading of the two physically 
disconnected passages in the fifth and following editions of the Principles, was made 
even more evident by the physical contiguity of the two passages in the previous 
editions of that book. Anyhow, even in the last four editions of the Principles, the link 
between the two disconnected sections is made explicit by a reference to Appendix F in 
the last paragraph of chapter II of Book V (Marshall 1961a, p. 336, and 1961b, p. 354). 
5 Walras is ready to acknowledge the central role played in the development of his 
system of thought by his analysis of the equilibrium determination problem in a pure-
exchange, two-commodity economy (see, for example, Walras 1954, p. 143). Marshall, 
on the contrary, is reluctant to openly ascribe a significant role to his pure-exchange 
models (that is, the ‘barter model’ and the ‘temporary equilibrium’ one). But, in spite of 
Marshall’s public propensity to play down the relevance of such models in his 
theorising, we shall show that the theoretical solutions adopted therein end up by 
crucially affecting his entire theoretical system (what, incidentally, is recognised by 
Marshall himself in private correspondence, as we shall see in section 4.4 below). 
6 As we shall see, the cardinality and additive separability assumptions concerning 
the consumers’ utility functions play a completely different role in Walras’ and 
Marshall’s theoretical systems: for while they can easily be disposed of in Walras’ case, 
they cannot instead be relaxed in Marshall’s case without jeopardising his whole 
theoretical construction. 
7 The above restrictions on the first- and second-order partial derivatives of the 
utility functions need some further qualifications, which will be provided in subsections 
3.2 and 4.2, concerning Walras and Marshall, respectively. 
8 As Walras himself puts it, in introducing equations similar to those discussed in 
the sequel of this subsection: 
I am assuming that, during this interval, the utility, both extensive 
and intensive, remains fixed for each party, which makes it 
possible for me to include time implicitly in the expression of 
utility. Were this not the case and had I supposed utility to be a 
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variable functionally related to time, then time would have had to 
figure explicitly in the problem. And we should then have passed 
from economic statics to economic dynamics. (Walras 1954, 
p. 117; Walras’ italics) 
9 The following quotation in the text is drawn from the English edition of the 
Eléments (Walras 1954, pp. 84-5; Walras’ italics). However, for reasons that will 
become apparent later in this subsection, we have reproduced the passage as it 
originally appeared in the first edition of the Eléments (apart from the English 
translation, of course), suppressing a few words inserted by Walras in the second and 
following editions of that book. On the changes undergone by this passage from the 
first to the second edition, see also Walras (1988, pp. 71-2). 
10 It may be interesting to note that, in Walras’ first theoretical work, predating the 
publication of the first instalment of the first edition of the Eléments in 1874 and 
concerning precisely the theory of the exchange of two commodities for one another, 
one can find an example which is virtually identical with the example in the Eléments, 
except that the commodity proper traded for money in the market under discussion is 
‘corn’, instead of being ‘3 per cent French Rentes’ (Walras 1874, pp. 31-2). 
11 As a matter of fact, the name ‘Law of Indifference’ was first employed in the 
second edition of The Theory (Jevons 1879, p. 136); in the first edition, instead, the 
same concept had been labelled ‘principle of uniformity’ (Jevons 1871, p. 99). What we 
have called here the ‘Law of One Price’ is also occasionally referred to in the literature 
as the ‘principle of completeness, or universality, of markets’, or else as the assumption 
of ‘universal price quoting of commodities (market completeness)’: see, for example, 
Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995, pp. 20, 550). Yet these labels appear to be 
misnomers and should be avoided in this context. 
12 On this, see also Donzelli (2008). 
13 On the construction of the aggregate excess demand function see, for example, 
Walras (1954, pp. 94-5). 
14 It should be added that, also in discussing the construction of individual demand 
and excess demand functions, Walras supposes the traders ‘to anticipate all possible 
values of [the price] from zero to infinity and determine accordingly all the 
corresponding values of [their excess demands]’ (Walras 1954, pp. 92); this means that 
traders are supposed to take all sorts of prices, be they equilibrium and disequilibrium 
prices, as given parameters, behaving competitively under all circumstances. See also, 
for example, Walras (1954, p. 122). 
15 See Donzelli (2007). 
16 As far as the pure exchange model is concerned, Walras recognises the 
‘instantaneous’ character of his equilibrium construct as early as in 1885, in the already 
quoted article on Gossen (Walras 1885, p. 312, fn.1). Instead, as far as the more 
comprehensive models with production, capital formation, circulation and money are 
concerned, one has to wait for the well-known passage of Lesson 29, newly added to 
the fourth edition of the Eléments (1900), where the implications of the so-called 
‘hypothèse des bons’ for the time structure of the analysis and the nature of the 
equilibrium construct are extensively discussed (Walras 1954, p. 319). 
17 This extension is carried out by Walras himself in Lesson 11 of the Eléments, 
which is the first Lesson of Part III of that book, entitled ‘Theory of Exchange of 
Several Commodities for One Another’. It may be interesting to note that Walras 
exclusively employs the expression ‘general equilibrium’, later used in a much more 
comprehensive sense, to denote a state of a multi-commodity, moneyless economy in 
which a consistent price system, normalised by choosing an appropriate numeraire, 
obtains. 
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18 In view of this, it is wholly inappropriate and misleading to call ‘Marshallian’, as 
many well-known advanced microeconomic text-books do (see, for example, Varian 
1992, pp. 105-9), what is to all purposes an ordinary Walrasian demand function, 
obtained under standard Walrasian assumptions about individual rationality and market 
competition, as stated in the previous section. 
19 Marshall provides two apparently similar, but really quite different, definitions of 
what might called a ‘true equilibrium rate’ or a ‘true equilibrium price’: the first is put 
forward in the passage of Appendix F to which this footnote is appended; the second, 
instead, is suggested in a passage appearing in Chapter II of Book V of the Principles 
(1961a, p. 333), a passage to which we shall come back in the next subsection. 
 According to the first definition, as we have seen, a certain ‘equilibrium rate of 
exchange […] has some sort of right to be called the true equilibrium rate, because if 
once hit upon it would be adhered to throughout’ (italics added). According to the 
second, instead, a certain ‘price […] has […] some claim to be called the true 
equilibrium price […] because if it were fixed on at the beginning, and adhered to 
throughout, it would exactly equate demand and supply’ (italics added). 
 As can be seen, the two definitions share in common the idea that, in order to 
qualify as a ‘true equilibrium rate of exchange’ (respectively, ‘price’), a ‘rate of 
exchange’ (respectively, ‘price’) should be constant throughout the trading process. But 
while the first definition seems to require, on top of this, that any such ‘true equilibrium 
rate’, once accidentally ‘hit upon’, should be deliberately preserved by the traders, the 
second does not make any such additional request. As will be seen in a moment, 
however, nothing in Marshall’s theory authorises one to suppose that, throughout the 
trading process, the traders have any reason to stick to any rate or price upon which 
they have accidentally stumbled at the beginning or, for that matter, at any stage of the 
process. Hence Marshall’s first definition actually presupposes more than what is 
justified by his own theory; for this reason, it ought to be discarded in favour of the 
second definition, as we shall do in the following. 
20 We stick here to Marshall’s second definition of a ‘true equilibrium rate’, which 
simply requires the rate of exchange to be constant throughout the trading process, 
without implying that the traders have any reason whatsoever to adhere to it. 
21 See Marshall (1961a, p. 792). Here Marshall, without explicitly mentioning 
Edgeworth, is clearly attacking the latter’s theory of recontracting, as put forward in 
Edgeworth (1881). 
22 As we shall see in the next subsection, another condition is in effect required, 
according to Marshall, for the marginal utility of money to be approximately constant in 
real-world trading processes. 
23 Marshall 1961a, pp. 791, 793; Marshall’s italics. The issue of equilibrium 
determinacy in Marshall’s theory of barter was critically discussed by Edgeworth in an 
article in Italian, published in an Italian journal one year after the appearance of the first 
edition of the Principles (Edgeworth 1891a). Edgeworth’s criticism was rebutted by a 
Cambridge mathematician, Arthur Berry (1891), who published his reply to Edgeworth 
in the same journal at Marshall’s instigation. Edgeworth’s rejoinder (1891b) ended the 
controversy. On this controversy see also Marshall’s comments in Note XII bis of the 
Mathematical Appendix of the Principles (Marshall 1961a, pp. 844-5), as well as the 
editorial notes and the letters to Edgeworth by Marshall and Berry, respectively, in 
Marshall (1961b, pp. 790-8). See also Peter Newman’s notable contribution in 
Whitaker (1990). 
24 See Marshall (1961a, pp. 93, 838). Also in Marshall’s case, as we already have 
done in Walras’ case and essentially for the same reasons, we shall exclude the 
possibility of satiation, even if Marshall does not rule it out (1961a, p. 93, fn.1). This 
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strong monotonicity assumption, however, can be dispensed with, at the cost of 
complicating somewhat the analysis. 
25 Since the marginal rate of substitution is invariant under any arbitrary strictly 
increasing transformation of the utility index, all properties of the marginal rate of 
substitution, including its independence of the amount of the money-like commodity in 
the consumption bundle, can be regarded as ordinal properties. 
 This has prompted Newman (1990, p. 265) to suggest that Marshall’s cardinal 
interpretation of the traders’ utility functions, and specifically his quasi-linearity 
assumption (that is, the assumption that the utility functions be additively separable in 
the amounts of the two commodities and linear in the second one, which in turn implies 
the constancy of the marginal utility of the money-like commodity), though sufficient 
for Marshall’s main result, are not necessary for it and can be dispensed with at no cost 
(on this see also Boulding 1945, p. 857, fn.3). This conclusion, however, is 
questionable, not only on general methodological grounds, as explained by Mas-Colell, 
Whinston and Green (1995, p. 50) in their discussion of cardinality and quasi-linearity, 
but also with specific reference to Marshall’s problem, should one attempt – as 
Newman in effect does (1990, pp. 265-7) – to generalise Marshall’s approach from a 
two-commodity economy with a money-like commodity to a multi-commodity 
economy with money. In fact, when there is more than one commodity proper in the 
economy, ‘Marshall’s fundamental property’ can only be preserved by assuming the 
traders’ utility functions to be additively separable in all their arguments (that is, in the 
amounts of all commodities proper and money) and quasi-linear in money. 
26 Marshall’s exclusion of all strategic considerations from his ‘temporary 
equilibrium’ model is openly stressed by Berry in a private letter to Edgeworth, once 
again written at Marshall’s suggestion (Berry’s letter is reproduced in Marshall 1961b, 
pp. 793-5). In trying to defend Marshall’s stance from Edgeworth’s criticism, Berry 
writes inter alia: 
Your argument as to recontracts which would disturb temporary 
equilibrium, I found very interesting and it seems to me quite true, 
but I hardly think it bears directly on Marshall’s chapter, where 
recontracts are tacitly excluded. 
27 As we have already seen in discussing Marshall’s model of an Edgeworth Box 
economy, Marshall does not believe that a constant rate of exchange between the two 
commodities, representing the ‘true equilibrium rate’, has any chance of prevailing over 
the trading process; in fact, referring to such ‘true position of equilibrium’, he states 
that ‘there is no reason to suppose that it will be reached in practice’ (Marshall 1961a, 
p. 791). As we shall see in a moment, Marshall is similarly convinced that there is no 
reason why, in his ‘temporary equilibrium’ model, the money price of the consumer 
good concerned should be supposed to remain constant over the trading process 
analysed therein. Indeed, Marshall appears sometimes to believe that the standard (that 
is, instantaneous) version of ‘Jevons’ Law of Indifference’ holds approximately true in 
‘perfect markets’: 
Thus the more nearly perfect a market is, the stronger is the 
tendency for the same price to be paid for the same thing at the 
same time in all parts of the market […]. (Marshall 1961a, p. 325; 
italics added) 
But this has nothing to do with assuming the constancy of price over time. 
28 While the first half of the bracketed expression (that is, ‘the amount which buyers 
were willing to purchase at that price’) may sound Walrasian, since the ‘buyers’ may be 
viewed as price-takers and quantity-adaptors, the second half (that is, ‘would be just 
equal to that for which sellers were willing to take that price’) certainly cannot be 
interpreted in that way, since the ‘sellers’ here are supposed to decide whether or not to 
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accept a certain price, given a certain quantity of output, which is surely not a 
competitive behaviour in the Walrasian sense. 
29 As clearly emerges from the starting paragraph of Chapter 3 of Book V of the 
Principles, which immediately follows the Chapter devoted to the ‘temporary 
equilibrium’ model, Marshall is perfectly aware that ‘[e]ven in the corn-exchange of a 
country town on a market-day the equilibrium price is affected by calculations of the 
future relations of production and consumption’, hence by expectations and speculation 
(Marshall 1961a, p. 337). But all these aspects, however important in the real world, are 
deliberately left out of the formal model of ‘temporary equilibrium’. 
30 Hence Hicks (1946, p. 57) is not only factually, but also substantially wrong, when 
he suggests that Marshall, unlike Walras, decided not ‘to treat the general theory of 
exchange before dealing with production’. 
31 Marshall is well aware of the fundamental role played by the additive separability 
of the traders’ utility functions in his pure-exchange models. Yet, in his typical style, 
instead of openly acknowledging the irreplaceable analytical role of that assumption in 
his theoretical construction, he prefers to justify it on empirical grounds. In fact, in Note 
XII bis of the Mathematical Appendix of the Principles, where Marshall discusses his 
model of an Edgeworth Box economy with a commodity proper (‘apples’) and a 
money-like commodity (‘nuts’), defending it from Edgeworth’s criticism, he writes: 
Prof. Edgeworth’s plan of representing U  and V  [the traders’ 
utility functions] as general functions of x and y [the quantities of the 
two commodities] has great attraction to the mathematician; but it 
seems less adapted to express the every-day facts of economic life 
than that of regarding, as Jevons did, the marginal utilities of apples 
as functions of x simply. (Marshall 1961a, p. 845) 
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